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Abstract
In this thesis I defend the view that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything, in the sense that could make one 
deserve to su'er blame or punishment (or to be less hap-
py). In essence, I argue that we do not have the kind of free 
will, or control, that moral responsibility requires. I do this 
by defending a version of the Basic Argument by Galen 
Strawson, and I use findings from neuroscience to add plau-
sibility to this argument. I also draw on insights from social 
psychology to explain why we might feel free and morally 
responsible even though we are not. Lastly, I discuss and 
reject a moral objection to my thesis: that people would 
become immoral if they stopped believing in free will and 
moral responsibility.
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1Introduction
The history of the moral sensations is the history of an error, 
the error of responsibility, which rests on the error of free will.             
—Nietzsche
According to the legend of King Xerxes of Persia (519–465 
bc), Xerxes and his men once tried to invade Greece by 
crossing the Hellespont, a narrow passage between the 
Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara. However, crossing the 
Hellespont proved to be somewhat di?cult for Xerxes and 
his men who tried to build a bridge across the passage. As 
soon as they managed to bridge the passage successfully, a 
great storm broke out and destroyed the bridge completely. 
Xerxes became furious when he heard of it, and he immedi-
ately sentenced the Hellespont to three hundred whiplashes, 
which were to be carried out along with a verbal condem-
nation of the passage.
Today, most people will probably smile at the thought of 
King Xerxes sentencing the sea to be whipped and ver-
bally condemned. For most people it seems ridiculous to 
whip and condemn the sea; both because it is futile and 
2because a thing like the sea cannot deserve punishment 
or blame. If the bridge had been destroyed by a personal 
error—perhaps by the overseer of the bridge, things might 
look di'erently, although the particular punishment seems 
a bit cruel. For most people there is a profound di'erence 
between damage done by a storm and damage done by a 
person. Most philosophers consider this a matter of moral 
responsibility.  
Traditionally, moral responsibility has been understood as 
the property that makes agents appropriate (or deserving) 
targets of blame and praise, punishment and reward. On 
this view, an agent is morally responsible if she deserves 
some kind of treatment based on her actions—not due to a 
potential social benefit following this treatment, but simply 
because she deserves it (Fischer et al., 2007:86). In other 
words, moral responsibility is what makes punishments 
and rewards fair or just without reference to any pragmatic 
considerations.
However, in this thesis I argue that for one to be morally 
responsible, in the above-mentioned sense, one would 
need to do something impossible; similar to Baron von 
Münchhausen who allegedly escaped from a swamp by 
3pulling himself (and his horse) up by his own hair. One 
would need to be morally responsible for who one is 
which is impossible because one’s personality is a result of 
things outside one’s control. And so I shall argue that no 
one is ever morally responsible for anything, at least not in 
the sense that could make one deserve to su'er blame or 
punishment (or to be less happy). So in a sense, I will argue: 
we are all whipping the sea when we consider each other 
and ourselves to be morally responsible for our actions and 
omissions.
For some people this line of thought will probably sound 
dangerous or immoral because some people might think 
that if this line of thought were correct then morality 
would go out the window, human life would be meaning-
less, and there would be no value to our existence. So let me 
start by clearing up a few misunderstandings. Firstly, mo-
rality does not hinge on the notion of moral responsibility 
in the above-mentioned sense, though it may hinge on a 
di'erent sense of moral responsibility which is more akin 
to the notions of obligation and duty. Secondly, there is no 
reason to believe that meaning and value would disappear 
from our lives together with the notion of moral responsi-
bility, as there is no reason why life should be considered 
4less significant just because we cannot deserve anything on 
basis of our actions and omissions. 
For some people the above line of thought will probably 
not sound dangerous or immoral at all, but insignificant 
or insubstantial instead. But the view I will be arguing for 
has many implications, both on a theoretical and a practical 
level. On a theoretical level, the notion of moral respon-
sibility plays an important role for many philosophical 
theories, namely theories that have to do with punishment 
and distributive justice. For example, consider the theory of 
retributivism, which is roughly the “view that punishment 
is justified by the desert of the o'ender” (Moore, 1997:87). 
This theory is arguably the dominant theory in the penal 
theoretical field and has been so for the last three or four 
decades (Ryberg, 2011). As retributivism depends on the 
notion of moral responsibility, the argument I will be mak-
ing has major implications for this theory. 
On a practical level, the notion of moral responsibility 
also plays an important role, as it is deeply ingrained in 
our daily lives, our society, and our political institutions. 
For example, if someone has done a favor to us, we would 
normally say that they deserve our help if they should ever 
5need it—especially if we have to choose between helping 
someone who has helped us in the past and someone who 
has declined to help us. The notion of moral responsibility 
also plays an important role when it comes to distribution 
of wealth in society. For example, unequal distribution of 
wealth is o@en justified with reference to individual choice 
and moral responsibility. The notion of moral responsibili-
ty also plays an important role within our system of justice, 
as this system in large parts punishes people according to 
their (perceived) just deserts, by virtue of their responsible 
choices. This is just to say that there are many practical 
implications to my argument. I shall return to these impli-
cations in the final chapter of the thesis.
The overall argument I will be making will basically have 
three parts. In the first part I will argue that it is impossible 
to satisfy one of the necessary conditions of moral respon-
sibility: the control (or freedom) condition. In some ways, 
this condition is equivalent to free will, so in e'ect I will 
also argue that we do not have free will. The argument I 
will be defending, following Strawson (1998, 2011), will 
roughly be as follows:
6(1)  What we do depends on who we are. 
(2)  To be morally responsible for what we do, we would 
therefore have to be morally responsible for who we 
are. 
(3)  But we cannot be morally responsible for who we 
are, as who we are depends on things outside our 
own control. 
Therefore, 
(4)  No one is ever morally responsible for anything. 
A@er stating the argument in full I proceed to discuss and 
ultimately reject some objections against this argument.
In the second part I consider and reject a somewhat indi-
rect objection to the above-mentioned argument: that the 
argument fails because it is contrary to common experi-
ence. We all have an unshakeable experience of being free 
and morally responsible, and it can be argued that the best 
theory is the one that fits best with experience. However, I 
will argue that our immediate experience cannot be taken 
7as veridical, and I will do this by drawing on some insights 
from social psychology. 
In the third part I consider a moral objection to my argu-
ment: that people would become somewhat immoral if 
they did not believe in free will and moral responsibility, an 
objection that actually seems to be supported by two recent 
empirical studies. Of course, the consequences of disbelief 
in moral responsibility have no bearings on the question of 
whether or not people really are morally responsible, but 
such consequences could give us a good reason to keep up 
the illusion. I reject this objection by arguing that the re-
sults of the two studies do not warrant the conclusion that 
people would become immoral if they did not believe in 
free will and moral responsibility. I also argue that even if 
people would become somewhat immoral there still might 
also be many potentially good consequences derived from 
disbelief in free will and in moral responsibility.
The argument I will be making is by no means a new 
argument. Nietzsche proposed a similar line of thought 
in Beyond Good and Evil (2002:21), and so did Sidgwick 
in The Method of Ethics (1981:284). In more recent years, 
Strawson has made this argument in Freedom and Belief 
8(1986). Though the argument will not be new, I will add 
that insights from neuroscience and related fields accentu-
ate the challenge the above line of thought raises for the 
notion of free will and moral responsibility. The reason for 
this is that neuroscience has showed that who we are, and 
consequently what we do, is dependent on the structure 
and functions of our brain—when our brain changes so do 
we. Furthermore, our neurological make-up influences our 
behavior in a much more salient way than e.g. our genes or 
upbringing, as these latter factors are far removed from our 
actions in space and time.
The thesis that I will defend will be as follows:
Thesis statement
No one is ever morally responsible for anything, as what 
we do depends on who we are, and we cannot be morally 
responsible for who we are.
Overview of the thesis
In the first chapter I give an account of what it means to be 
morally responsible for an action or an omission. Since the 
9notion of responsibility is quite ambiguous I will do this by 
contrasting the notion of moral responsibility with other 
(related) notions of responsibility. In this chapter I will also 
present two standard conditions on moral responsibility: 
the control (or freedom) condition and the knowledge (or 
epistemic) condition. As the former condition is closely 
connected to the notion of free will (I shall later argue that 
this condition cannot be satisfied), I proceed in the second 
chapter with an account of what it means to be acting with 
free will.
In the second chapter I address the notion of free will, and 
I do this by contrasting this notion with free action and by 
noting some of the standard distinctions in the philosophi-
cal debates on free will. The point of this chapter is both to 
get clear on the control (or freedom) condition on moral 
responsibility and to note a few concepts that will be useful 
in my later discussions. At the end of this chapter I present 
some empirical data from neuroscience, concerning the 
relationship between brain and behavior that are important 
in relation to the argument I will be making in the third 
chapter.
In the third chapter I put forth an argument for the impos-
10
sibility of moral responsibility, following Strawson (1998, 
2011), and I will discuss what I take to be the three best 
objections to the argument: (i) that the argument relies on 
a faulty principle of reasoning, (ii) that the argument em-
ploys a too demanding notion of control, and (iii) that the 
argument begs the question. I will argue that none of these 
objections succeed. I will begin by outlining the argument 
and clarifying some of the premises of the argument, and 
proceed to discuss and reject the objections.
In the fourth chapter I discuss an (indirect) objection to the 
argument I made in the third chapter: that the argument is 
contrary to our common experience. As noted, we all have 
an immediate experience of being free and morally respon-
sible, and this experience needs to be explained away if my 
argument is to succeed. I do this by raising doubt about the 
veracity of our immediate experiences, mostly by drawing 
on insights from psychology. In other words, I will present 
an error theory of free will and moral responsibility in this 
chapter.
In the fi@h chapter I discuss a moral objection to my argu-
ment: that people would become immoral if they stopped 
believing in free will and moral responsibility. As noted, 
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two recent empirical studies actually seem to support this 
objection. However, I argue that the results of these studies 
do not warrant any sweeping conclusions, and even if they 
did, disbelief in free will and moral responsibility might 
still have more good consequences overall, namely more 
compassion, equanimity, equality, and sympathy.
In the sixth chapter I note some of the implications of the 
argument I have put forth in this thesis. The notion of 
moral responsibility arguably plays an important role in 
our daily lives and many of the arrangements of our society, 
namely institutions that have to do with punishment and 
distribution. Therefore it seems appropriate to touch upon 
the implications of the idea that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything. This is the subject of the sixth and 
final chapter of the thesis.  
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Moral responsibility: get           
familiar
We all have an intuitive understanding of what it means 
to be morally responsible for an action, but the notion of 
responsibility is quite ambiguous. Therefore, in the follow-
ing I will contrast the notion of moral responsibility with 
other (related) types of responsibilities: causal responsibility, 
prospective responsibility, virtue responsibility, and legal 
responsibility. This should give a more clear understanding 
of the notion of moral responsibility.
I will then proceed to describe two central conditions of be-
ing morally responsible from philosophical literature, going 
back at least to Aristotle. First, that one can only be morally 
responsible for actions that are within ones control—the 
control (or freedom) condition. Second, that one can only 
be morally responsible for an action if one did not act in ig-
norance of the relevant facts—the knowledge (or epistemic) 
condition. Here I will focus on the control condition, as it 
is this condition I shall later argue cannot be satisfied, but I 
think it is useful also to know something about the knowl-
edge condition, as this condition can be helpful in illumi-
13
nating the notion of moral responsibility. Firstly, however, I 
want to expand on the notion of moral responsibility, and 
note a couple of things about this notion that are import-
ant in relation to my argument in the next chapter.
What is moral responsibility?
In the introduction I said that moral responsibility is the 
property that makes agents appropriate targets of blame 
and praise, reward and punishment. On this view, which is 
commonplace in philosophical literature, moral responsi-
bility is desert-entailing in the sense that morally responsi-
ble agents can deserve blame and praise, punishment and 
reward (King, 2012). For example, we might say that Peter 
was morally responsible for breaking Paul’s glasses, and that 
he therefore deserves to be blamed for their breakage—no 
matter whether blaming him would have any good con-
sequences or not. Importantly, people can only be morally 
responsible for actions and omissions that have their origin 
(or arche) in the agent, in the sense that the action or omis-
sion can be properly attributed to the agent (Moya, 2006:78; 
Eshleman, 2009). For example, if somebody coerced Peter 
to break Paul’s glasses, then Peter would not be morally 
responsible for their breakage. In this section I want to note 
14
a couple of things about the notion of moral responsibility, 
before I proceed to describe some other forms of responsi-
bility and their relations to the notion of moral responsibil-
ity.
The first thing to note about moral responsibility is that 
this notion is closely related to the notion of free will, as 
free will is usually taken to be a necessary condition on 
moral responsibility. This is because most philosophers 
equate the control (or freedom) condition with free will. 
For this reason the philosophical debates about the notions 
of free will and moral responsibility are “near co-extensive” 
(Levy & McKenna, 2009:97f). For some, it is even “primarily, 
though not exclusively, because of the intimate connection 
between free will and moral responsibility that the free 
will problem is seen as an important one” (McKenna, 2009). 
Since I will later be arguing that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything, as the control (or freedom) condi-
tion cannot be satisfied, I will go into detail with the notion 
of free will in the following chapter.
The second thing to note about moral responsibility is that, 
besides the notion of free will, moral responsibility is also 
intimately linked with the notions of desert, blame, praise, 
15
punishment, and reward. Hence, on the most common 
views, “to be morally responsible for something, say an ac-
tion, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, 
blame, or something akin to these—for having performed 
it” (Eshleman, 2009). According to Williams, most philoso-
phers see this as an issue of desert, and the justification for 
this desert as a matter of “individual choice or control. You 
chose to act selfishly: you deserve blame. You chose not to 
take precautions: you deserve to bear the consequences. You 
chose to break the law: you deserve punishment” (Williams, 
2009). Importantly, one can (arguably) deserve something 
without being morally responsible in any way, e.g. a victim 
might for example be said to deserve compensation for a 
crime, or it might be said that everybody deserves a fair 
trial no matter what they have done. However, one cannot 
deserve to su'er blame or punishment for an action, unless 
one was morally responsible for the action in question (Mc-
Leod, 2008). I shall return to this point in the last chapter 
of the thesis. 
The third thing to note about moral responsibility is that 
“a morally responsible agent is not merely a person who is 
able to do moral right or wrong. Beyond this, she is ac-
countable for her morally significant conduct” (McKenna, 
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2009, author’s emphasis). This means that there is a dif-
ference between being a moral agent and being a morally 
responsible agent—only morally responsible agents are 
accountable for their actions. This is important because 
my argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility 
should not be taken to imply that people are not moral 
agents, only that they are not morally responsible. 
The fourth thing to note about moral responsibility is that 
there is a di'erence between saying someone is morally 
responsible for something and holding someone morally 
responsible for something. From a historic point of view, 
the former has usually been associated with a merit-based 
(or deontological) interpretation of moral responsibility, 
while the latter has normally been associated with a con-
sequentialist interpretation (Eshleman, 2009). I shall only 
argue that people never are morally responsible, not that 
they should never be held morally responsible.
Di3erent types of responsibility
As noted earlier, there are lots of di'erent conceptions one 
might have in mind when talking about responsibility. In 
the following I want to touch upon those meanings of 
17
responsibility that are related to, but not be confused with, 
the notion of moral responsibility. This should help make 
clearer what I have in mind when discussing the notion of 
moral responsibility.
Causal responsibility
Sometimes when we say that someone was responsible for 
an action, we might simply mean that they were the cause 
of an outcome. This notion of responsibility is something 
that is not restricted to agents—like gaseous pollutions can 
be said to be responsible for acidic rain. In those cases we 
do not claim that this person or phenomenon was morally 
responsible for the outcome, only that this person or phe-
nomenon was the cause, which is (arguably) not blamewor-
thy in itself. Consequently, the critical di'erence between 
the notion of causal responsibility and the notion of moral 
responsibility is that the former does “not imply any assign-
ment of blame or desert” (Williams, 2009). 
However, for an agent to be morally responsible for an ac-
tion (or an omission), it is o@en taken to be crucial whether 
or not the agent played a causal role in the outcome. For 
example, did the agent in question pull the trigger on the 
18
gun? Did he or she actually push the victim o' a cli'? And 
so on. It is clear though, that an agent can be causally re-
sponsible for an action without being morally responsible 
for this action. For example, if one hands a glass of watery 
fluid to someone, not knowing that the fluid in the glass 
is really poison and not water, then one is causally, but not 
morally, responsible for the outcome of the situation. Like-
wise, one can also be morally responsible for something 
one is not causally responsible for (at least on some inter-
pretations of causality)—e.g. letting a child drown.
The notion of causality is perhaps even more ambiguous 
than the notion of responsibility. However, it should be 
clear what the basic idea is here. One is causally responsible 
for an outcome if one played a crucial role in bringing this 
outcome about. 
Prospective responsibility
Another sense of responsibility that we might have in mind 
when saying that someone is responsible for an action is 
the notion of prospective responsibility, which can perhaps 
best be understood as a duty or an obligation. For exam-
ple, we might say that someone is responsible for bringing 
19
food to a party, taking care of their own health, or doing 
something about the climate changes. In this sense of the 
word, what we are concerned with is what people “ought 
to be doing or attending to” (Williams, 2009). One might 
say that this notion of responsibility is forward-looking, 
as opposed to the notion of moral responsibility, which 
is backward-looking. (This is why moral responsibility in 
the desert-entailing sense is sometimes called retrospective 
responsibility.) Just like the notion of causal responsibil-
ity, prospective responsibility does not in itself imply any 
assignment of blame or desert. 
A typical form of this sense of responsibility is a role-re-
sponsibility. For example, we might say that politicians are 
responsible for doing something about the climate changes 
because of their roles. Likewise we might say that parents 
are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, or that 
bus drivers are responsible for the safety of their passengers. 
In those cases, what we mean is that politicians, parents, 
and bus drivers have certain duties or obligations. When 
one assumes the role of a politician, parent, or bus driver, 
“certain duties, or obligations, follow” (Eshleman, 2009). 
Although prospective responsibility o@en comes in the 
form of a role-responsibility, it need not be connected with 
20
a specific role. For example, we might say that everybody 
is responsible for taking care of their own health, or that 
everybody is responsible for helping people in need. 
There is (apparently) at least one straightforward relation 
between the notion of prospective responsibility and moral 
responsibility. We might say that people are morally re-
sponsible for something if they fail to perform their duty 
or obligation. For example, since bus drivers are responsible 
for the safety of their passengers, the bus driver might be 
blamed or punished in case of a bus crash. This is usual-
ly justified by the thought that the bus would not have 
crashed if the bus driver had taken his or her responsibility 
more seriously (Williams, 2009). However, in some cases we 
might excuse the bus driver—say for example if the crash 
was caused by some kind of faulty machinery that the bus 
driver was in no position to have known about.
As with the notion of causation, the notions of obligation 
and duty is perhaps just as ambiguous as the notion of 
responsibility, but the general idea should be clear. One has 
an obligation or a duty to perform an action if that action 
is morally required, either because of some special obliga-
tion (e.g. a role-specific obligation) or a general obligation 
21
that is owed towards everyone.
Virtue responsibility 
Sometimes we might say that a person is irresponsible, and 
by this we do not mean that this person has no duties or 
obligations—or that this person is never an appropriate 
target of blame or praise. Rather, what we mean is that 
this person does not take her (prospective) responsibilities 
seriously. For example, we might say that a parent who 
smokes in front of her child is being irresponsible, in the 
sense that this person fails to take her responsibility as a 
parent seriously. This kind of responsibility is called ‘virtue 
responsibility.’
When we say that someone is responsible in this sense, we 
are giving this person a sort of praise and vice versa, when 
we say that someone is irresponsible, we are giving this 
person a sort of blame. However, when we say that some-
one is irresponsible we do not say that this person deserves 
to su'er blame or punishment because of his or her actions. 
On the contrary, people who constantly fail to live up to 
their responsibilities are o@en thought to be less appro-
priate targets of blame than normal human adults, as they 
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seem to be unable to help themselves with their irresponsi-
ble behavior. Likewise, people are usually given less duties 
or obligations if they have shown themselves to be unable 
to fulfill their responsibilities (Williams, 2009). 
Virtue responsibility is also the sense of responsibility 
involved when we say that a corporation (or a government) 
is socially responsible. By this we usually mean that the 
corporation takes its prospective responsibilities seriously 
and takes action when it has done something wrong. In this 
sense, a responsible agent “can be relied on to judge and to 
act in certain morally desirable ways, (...) and when things 
go wrong, such a person will be prepared to take responsi-
bility for dealing with things” (Williams, 2009). 
Legal responsibility
The last type of responsibility I shall mention here is legal 
responsibility. The relationship between moral and legal re-
sponsibility is particularly important for my thesis, as I shall 
later argue that a major part of our justice system (mistak-
enly) relies on the notion of moral responsibility. 
Though the notions of moral and legal responsibility are 
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connected in many ways, they sometimes come apart. One 
can arguably be morally responsible for many kinds of 
actions that are not subject to legal responsibility. For ex-
ample, one can be morally responsible for cheating on ones 
girlfriend, or for harming the environment through per-
sonal overconsumption. Conversely, one can also be legally 
responsible for something one is not morally responsible 
for (Du', 2007:229). For example, in some jurisdictions an 
employer can be legally responsible for damage caused by 
her workers—even if this damage happens through no fault 
of the employer. One can also be liable for legal sanctions 
if something happens to a car one has rented—even if one 
did not do anything wrong. However, most cases of legal 
responsibility in the Western world, especially in criminal 
law, are bound up with the notion of moral responsibility 
(Du', 2009:978). 
Legal responsibility can be understood as “a specific in-
stance of the more general practice of holding agents 
responsible for what they do” in the sense that legal respon-
sibility is an institutionalized and codified form of moral 
responsibility (Tadros, 2005:21). However, legal responsibil-
ity is also an ambiguous concept in the sense that there is 
at least four di'erent ways that the law is concerned with 
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responsibility (Hart, 1968; Tadros, 2005; Vincent, 2010). 
Firstly, the law is concerned with whether or not the agent 
in question has the status of a legally responsible agent, 
children for example do not have this status, but normal 
adults do. Secondly, the law is also concerned with whether 
or not the agent in question had certain obligations “in 
order to determine whether [the agent] ought to be liable 
for the resultant event” (e.g. a role-responsibility). Thirdly, 
the law is also concerned with whether or not the agent in 
question was causally responsible for the resultant event 
(e.g. did the agent push the murder victim o' the cli'?). 
Fourthly, the law is also concerned with whether or not 
the action in question can be attributed to the agent. If the 
agent for example was involuntary intoxicated to a certain 
degree, then he or she cannot be held legally responsible for 
his or her actions (Tadros, 2005). 
Two conditions of moral responsibility
What should be clear from the preceding and following sec-
tions is that in order to be morally responsible for an action 
(or an omission), one has to be the origin or arche of that 
action in the sense that the action flowed properly from the 
agent, and not from any external or internal cause that was 
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alien to the agent in question.
Traditionally, being the arche of an action has been seen as 
a matter of satisfying two conditions: a control (or free-
dom) condition and a knowledge (or epistemic) condition 
(Aristotle, 1998:34'; Fisher & Ravizza, 1998:12'; Du', 
2009; Eshleman, 2009, Williams, 2009). I will specify these 
conditions in the following sections, but the idea is basical-
ly this: If Peter breaks Paul’s glasses by stepping on them, 
we might say that he is responsible for breaking them and 
consequently blame him for it. But if he did not have con-
trol over his body, say he tripped (through no fault of his 
own)—or if he did not know that the glasses were lying be-
neath the carpet (again through no fault of his own), then 
he is not responsible for breaking the glasses and should 
not be blamed for it. Surely, he would be causally respon-
sible for breaking the glasses, in the sense that his actions 
played a crucial causal role in the incident, but he would 
not be morally responsible; he would not be blameworthy. 
The control condition
According to the first condition of moral responsibility, 
people are only morally responsible for actions that are 
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within their control, i.e. freely chosen actions. For example, 
if Lisa could not help bumping into Anna on the train, for 
instance if someone pushed her; she would not be morally 
responsible for the mishap. For most people, this will prob-
ably seem like a pretty clear case of an action that was not 
freely chosen. 
However, other cases can be more di?cult. For example, 
it is di?cult to say whether or not Lisa would be morally 
responsible for bumping into Anna if she did so to avoid 
tripping and hurting herself. On one hand we might say 
that this action was within her control, in the sense that 
she could have chosen to take the fall, but on the other we 
might say that she did not really have a choice if she was 
trying to avoid greater harm. Perhaps such a case could be 
considered a freely chosen act with extenuating circum-
stances.
Then there are also cases where an action seems to be 
entirely within an agent’s control; for example, if Lisa 
bumped into Anna on purpose, perhaps because Anna had 
received a promotion that Lisa wanted. In such a case it 
seems obvious that Lisa had control over her actions—she 
could easily have chosen not to bump into Anna, but she 
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decided to do so anyway out of spite. I reckon this can be 
considered a paradigmatic case of someone being morally 
responsible for an action. However, I shall later argue that it 
is impossible to satisfy the control condition even in a case 
like this. In essence, I shall argue that agents like Lisa are 
not really morally responsible for their actions—although 
it may be justifiable to hold them responsible anyway.
The knowledge condition
The second condition of moral responsibility has to do 
with knowledge, in the sense that one can only be morally 
responsible for an action if one acted with knowledge of 
all the relevant facts. For example, if Peter did not know 
(through no fault of his own) that the glass he handed Paul 
contained poison and not water—for instance if Brian 
wanted to kill Paul and had therefore tampered with the 
water—then Peter should not be regarded as morally re-
sponsible for Paul’s death. 
As with the control condition there are some cases that 
seem clear, like the above, where an agent surely did not 
know—and could not have known—the relevant facts of 
the situation. But there are also cases that seem less clear. 
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For example, if Peter had reason to suspect that Brian had 
tampered with the water, then perhaps he should have 
known that the fluid in the glass was not safe to drink.
And then there are also cases where it seems pretty clear 
that the agent in question did know—or should have 
known—some relevant fact. If Brian for example had told 
Peter about his plan to poison Paul, and Peter handed him 
the glass anyway—because Peter also wanted Paul dead—
both Brian and Peter would be morally responsible for 
Paul’s death. 
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Free will, moral responsibility, 
and neuroscience
A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants.      
—Schopenhauer
In the preceding chapter I said that there are two condi-
tions of being morally responsible: the control (or freedom) 
condition and the knowledge (or epistemic) condition. 
In this chapter I want to expand a bit on the first of these 
conditions, the control (or freedom) condition, as I will 
later argue that this condition cannot be satisfied and con-
sequently that moral responsibility is impossible. In other 
words I will argue that we do not have free will—in the 
sense required for moral responsibility. Since the notion of 
free will is at least as vague and ambiguous as the notion of 
responsibility some clarification seems to be in order.
I will begin by making a few general points about the no-
tion of free will, by contrasting it with other related notions, 
namely free action. A@erwards I will present some of the 
standard distinctions in the philosophical debate on free 
will, which will be useful when we get to the arguments in 
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the following chapters. Lastly I will present some empirical 
data on free will from neuroscience and related fields. This 
is both to draw on some insights from these fields in rela-
tion to the philosophical debate and to make a few points 
about the relationship between brain, mind, and behavior 
that are important in relation to my main argument in the 
next chapter. 
What is free will?
The notion of free will is one of the oldest and most con-
tested areas of philosophy—and “just about every major 
philosopher has had something to say about it” (O’Connor, 
2011). It is therefore no small task to say what free will is, es-
pecially as “there is probably no single concept of [this no-
tion]” in the philosophical literature (McKenna, 2009). For 
most philosophers though, free will is primarily “a feature 
of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally respon-
sible for their conduct” (ibid.). That is, to satisfy the control 
(or freedom) condition simply means to be acting with 
free will (Timpe, 2006; Levy & McKenna, 2009; O’Connor, 
2011). Some philosophers also think “that free will might 
be required for a range of other things, including moral 
value, originality, and self-governance” (Fischer et al, 2007:1). 
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Furthermore, “free will also appears to be a condition on 
desert for one’s accomplishments…dignity of persons; and 
on the value we accord to love and friendship” (O’Connor, 
2011; although cf. Pereboom, 2001).
Some philosophers, however, deny that free will is a req-
uisite for moral responsibility (e.g. Fischer, 1994)—not 
because they deny the relevance of the control (or freedom) 
condition, but because they assert that this condition can 
be satisfied without free will. Nevertheless, the argument I 
will put forth in the following chapter still applies, as I will 
argue that even a modest conception of the control condi-
tion cannot be satisfied. Since most philosophers however 
do equate the control (or freedom) condition with free will 
I will follow suit here.
To be clear, free will is also some times taken to be a neces-
sary condition of morality itself, as one cannot have a moral 
duty or obligation to do the impossible (e.g. Parfit, 2011). 
This is because it seems obvious that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. 
For example, it does not make sense to say that Tom ought 
to save Xavier if he can only do so by swimming faster than 
a sailfish—the fastest swimmer in the sea. Hence, morality 
requires some kind of power or freedom. However, this is 
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not the kind of freedom I have in mind when discussing 
free will. Most philosophers seem to agree that we are free 
in the sense that is required by morality. What I will be 
discussing is a more ambitious sense of freedom—the kind 
of freedom that could make one an apt candidate for moral 
responsibility in the desert-entailing sense.
A few related notions
Although there is not much agreement in the literature 
about what free will is, it is clear that one can distinguish 
between the notion of freedom at stake in philosophical 
discussions and other concepts of freedom, e.g. religious 
and political freedom. One can also distinguish between 
free will and “several other concepts associated with human 
agency, such as autonomy and authenticity” (Fischer et al., 
2007:1). For example, autonomy “is generally understood 
to refer to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s 
life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s 
own and not the product of manipulative or distorting 
external forces.” In this sense, autonomy “seems an irrefut-
able value, especially since its opposite—being guided by 
forces external to the self and which one cannot authen-
tically embrace—seems to mark the height of oppression” 
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(Christman, 2011). Clearly one does not need free will to 
experience the value of autonomy, and one can consistently 
believe in this value without believing in free will. 
Free will and free action
In lack of a strict definition it might be useful to contrast 
the notion of free will with free action, in order to get a 
better understanding of what free will is all about. In the 
following I will therefore contrast these notions. This will 
also be useful in understanding the di'erence between 
compatibilism and incompatibilism, a philosophical dis-
tinction I will explain in a following section.
It seems clear that free will is more than just free action—or 
being free to do what one wants. We are all (somewhat) free 
to do what we want in a free society; we can buy what we 
want, travel where we like, vote for whom we want to, and 
so on. But the freedom involved in free will runs deeper 
than this. To see this, suppose you had all the freedom 
in the world to do all the above and similar things, but 
your desires were manipulated by the powers that be, e.g. 
through the use of neurochemistry. In such a world you 
would have all the everyday freedom possible, but it seems 
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like your freedom of will would be severely limited. You 
would be free to act and choose what you willed, but you 
would not be free to choose what it is that you willed (Kane, 
2005:2). So it appears that free will not only has to do with 
choosing what to do, but also with being able to choose 
what it is one wants to do—or at least being able to choose 
a course of action without being manipulated, deceived, 
and so on. 
To further expand on the di'erence between free will and 
free action, consider a woman, Joan, who is deliberating 
about whether or not she should go to dance class in the 
evening. On one hand she usually enjoys going to class, and 
she already paid for the class, but on the other hand she 
is really tired from work. Lets say she decides to go, as she 
believes that she will be better o' by going than by staying 
home. 
Most people would probably say that Joan acted freely—in 
the sense that nothing or no one forced her to go. This is 
also in line with the account of freedom given by many 
philosophers (Timpe, 2006). For example, Hobbes famous-
ly defined freedom (or liberty) as “the absence of external 
impediments” (Hobbes, 2011:128). In a similar vein, Hume 
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defined freedom (or liberty) as an absence of coercion, 
claiming that: “this hypothetical liberty is universally 
allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and 
in chains” (Hume, 2007:69). These accounts suggest that to 
be free is simply to be able to carry out a chosen course of 
action. So Hobbes and Hume would say that Joan is free 
to go to her dance class as long as nothing or no one forces 
her to go or stay at home. They would also say that her act 
would be of her own free will as long as nothing or no one 
forced a certain decision upon her.
Here we can see an important distinction between free will 
and free action. “This distinction is motivated by the appar-
ent fact that agents can possess free will without also having 
freedom of action” (Timpe, 2006). Suppose that, unknown 
to Joan, her dance teacher was ill on that particular night, 
so the class was cancelled which would make it impossible 
for Joan to attend the dance class. Here we (arguably) have 
a case involving free will—because Joan freely chose to 
go to class, but not involving free action—because it was 
impossible for her to actually attend.
In this way free will and free action are conceptually 
distinct. And just like one can (arguably) have free will 
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without free action, one can also have freedom of action 
without having free will. Suppose that Joan went to class 
because she had been brainwashed by an evil dance teacher. 
In this case Joan would still be able to do what she wants—
she would not be a prisoner in chains—but most would 
probably say that she would not be acting on free will. 
Furthermore, even inanimate objects can have freedom of 
action in the above sense, as when we say that the water 
runs freely, but no one would reasonably claim that water 
can have free will.
So an act of free will is more than just a free act, and a free 
act is not necessarily an act of free will. It seems that it is 
not enough to be able to do what one wants to be acting 
with free will—one also needs to have a certain kind of 
control over one’s desires, character, motivations etc. This 
appears to be the reason why manipulation and deceit 
undermine one’s freedom of will. 
To be clear, the subject of discussion in the philosophical 
debates on free will is not whether or not we have the kind 
of freedom that Hume was talking about when he said that 
liberty belongs to everyone who is not a prisoner and in 
chains. Everyone seems to agree that we are typically free 
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in this sense—both with regards to free action and free will. 
The question is whether this kind of freedom (compatibilist 
freedom) is worthy of the name ‘free will’, and consequent-
ly if this kind of freedom is su?cient for genuine moral 
responsibility. In the following chapter I will argue that it 
is not su?cient for moral responsibility, as this kind of free-
dom does not run as deep as the notion of moral responsi-
bility seems to require.
Before we get to that, however, I want to note a few useful 
distinctions from the philosophical literature. These distinc-
tions will be useful in understanding the argument I will 
be making in the following chapter, and they will also pro-
vide some useful concepts for my later discussions. Lastly, I 
want to draw on some empirical data from neuroscience 
and related fields in order to bolster some of the claims I 
will be making in relation to my argument.
A few useful distinctions
There are a number of di'erent positions in the philosoph-
ical discussions on free will and moral responsibility, and 
not all will be presented here. The following will only be a 
rough sketch of the landscape, and I will not go into depth 
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with any of the specific positions. A basic overview is all 
that is needed for the task at hand.
Traditionally, the debate about free will and moral respon-
sibility has centered on the thesis of determinism, and 
this thesis will also serve as the point of departure in this 
section, as most of the di'erent positions in the philo-
sophical discussions on free will relate to determinism in 
some way. Therefore it is useful to know what determinism 
means. Roughly, determinism is “the idea that every event is 
necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together 
with the laws of nature” (Hoefer, 2010). 
It is easy to see why determinism has played such an im-
portant role in the debates on free will and moral responsi-
bility. If everything that happens is a result of a conjunction 
between the past and the laws of nature, then it appears 
like there is no room for free will and moral responsibility. 
If determinism is true, then it would seem like everything 
one does is a result of things outside one’s control, as one 
cannot control neither what has happened in the past nor 
the laws of nature. On the other hand, indeterminism also 
seems to pose a threat to the notion of free will, as “it is 
far from obvious how indeterminism would help” (Clarke, 
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2008). Indeterminism just seems to leave everything up to 
chance, which does not appear to be an improvement over 
determinism. I take this to be the problem of free will—if 
determinism is true, then it seems doubtful that we are free 
and morally responsible; yet if determinism is false, it also 
seems doubtful that we are free and morally responsible. 
In the following sections I will present some of the stan-
dard views on free will from philosophical literature, most 
of which are an attempt at a solution (or dissolution) to 
the problem of free will. For instance, some philosophers 
believe that free will is compatible with determinism (com-
patibilism), others think that it is not (incompatibilism). 
Out of the latter group some assert free will and deny de-
terminism (libertarianism) while some assert determinism 
and deny free will (hard determinism). A small minority, 
myself included, holds that free will is impossible no matter 
whether determinism is true or false (skepticism). In the 
following sections I will outline these positions.
Compatibilism
One attempt at a solution to the problem of free will is 
compatibilism. This is the idea that free will (and moral 
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responsibility) is compatible with the truth of determinism 
(McKenna, 2009). Notably, one does not need to believe 
that determinism is true to be a compatibilist; one only 
needs to believe that the truth of determinism does not 
rule out free will and moral responsibility. 
Now, what makes the compatibilists believe that free will 
and moral responsibility can be saved from the threat of de-
terminism? Well, one of the chief concerns of determinism 
is that it seems to leave one without alternative possibilities 
for action, as there can only be one possible outcome of a 
situation if determinism is true. And some philosophers 
hold that one cannot be free and morally responsible if 
one does not have alternative possibilities. But consider, for 
example, a man who witnesses an accident and does not 
call for help, simply because he cannot be bothered. Does 
it really matter that his cellphone, unknown to him, was 
out of battery and that he therefore was unable to call for 
help (adapted from Frankfurt, 1969)? Most would probably 
say no and consider him to be morally responsible for not 
calling anyway—even though he did not have any alterna-
tive possibilities. Examples like this are a major reason for 
compatibilists to believe that the truth of determinism does 
not rule out free will and moral responsibility.
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On the compatibilist view, free will simply consists in the 
absence of external impediments or coercion (like Hobbes 
and Hume claimed), and compatibilists typically argue that 
incompatibilism rests on the mistaken view that causation 
equals coercion (Levy, 2007:223). But there is a profound 
di'erence between coercion and causation, and it is only 
coercion (and similar impediments) that threatens free 
will— according to the compatibilist.
Incompatibilism
Although many philosophers have been convinced that 
free will and moral responsibility can be reconciled with 
the truth of determinism, some hold the view that free will 
and moral responsibility are incompatible with the truth of 
determinism. Notably, one does not need to believe in the 
truth of indeterminism to be an incompatibilist; one only 
needs to believe that the truth of determinism rules out 
free will and moral responsibility. As noted earlier, incom-
patibilism comes in two flavors: libertarianism and hard 
determinism. The former asserts free will and denies de-
terminism, while the latter asserts determinism and denies 
free will. Let us start with the libertarians. 
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Libertarians hold the view that determinism is false, and 
that at least some agents in the world have free will. Their 
challenge is to explain how indeterminism is an improve-
ment over determinism, as indeterminism just seems to 
leave everything up to chance. The traditional answer is that 
undetermined free acts do not “merely happen by chance” 
as they are caused by the “agent itself, which cannot be 
caused in turn by prior events because it is not an event and 
therefore not of the right type to be the e'ect of any cause” 
(Kane, 2005:23). On this view, agents are somewhat out of 
the causal loop, “we initiate causal chains, but nothing and 
no one causes us to do this” (Vihvelin, 2011). And so the 
libertarian promotes a third way between necessity and 
randomness.
This seems to be in line with our common experience. 
Consider for example a simple test. In five seconds, either 
close your eyes for two seconds or keep them open for two 
seconds. …No matter what you chose, was your choice 
really due to either necessity or randomness? Most would 
probably say no; it was freely chosen. The libertarian would 
agree. 
The other flavor of incompatibilism is hard determinism, 
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which is the view that determinism is true and that the 
truth of determinism rules out free will and moral respon-
sibility. The hard determinists’ challenge (along with the 
skeptics) is to explain why we nevertheless have an unshake-
able experience of being free and morally responsible, as 
the theory does not fit with our common experience. One 
way of responding is simply to say that we are determined 
to have this kind of experience! Another is to draw on 
insights from psychology about the unreliability of our 
common experiences—a strategy I employ in chapter 5. 
Hard determinists typically argue that everything we do is a 
function of the past and the laws of nature which are both 
outside our control, and consequently we cannot be mor-
ally responsible for our actions. While this may be contrary 
to our common experience, the hard determinist holds that 
it is o@en the case that the best available theory runs con-
trary to experience. For example, time does not appear to be 
relative, but it is—according to the best available scientific 
theory.
Skepticism
The last position I will mention here is skepticism. This 
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is the view that we do not have free will and that we are 
not morally responsible; no matter whether the world is 
deterministic or not. Skeptics typically argue that it is luck 
and not determinism or indeterminism that challenges the 
notion of free will and moral responsibility. In the words 
of Strawson: “luck swallows everything” (1998, 2011), or at 
least it swallows moral responsibility (Levy, 2011:212). This 
is also the basis of my argument in the following chapter.
How might luck undermine the notion of free will and 
moral responsibility? Well, there are at least three di'erent 
types of luck (Nagel, 1979:28'; Nelkin, 2008): (i) resultant 
luck, (ii) circumstantial luck, and (iii) constitutive luck. Re-
sultant luck has to do with outcomes. For example, consider 
two women who are both driving under the influence of 
alcohol, both equally reckless. One of them does not hit 
someone on the way home, and the other one does. This 
would be a case of resultant luck. 
Circumstantial luck has to do with luck in the circumstanc-
es we find ourselves in. For example, consider the German 
Nazi collaborators during the Nazi era. If their workplaces 
had transferred them to another country in 1929, they 
might have lived exemplary lives. In that case they would 
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have been lucky in the circumstantial sense. 
Constitutive luck is luck in the way one is, namely in one’s 
dispositions, traits, and character. Consider for example 
someone who is very intelligent, ambitious, and industri-
ous who goes on to earn a great deal of money. This would 
(largely) be a case of constitutive luck, since who we are 
is to a great extent a function of our genes, neurological 
make-up, caregivers, peers, and other environmental influ-
ences which we do not have control over. 
Since what we do is (primarily) a result of who we are, and 
we do not really control who we are, the skeptic argues that 
we do not really have free will, and consequently that we 
cannot be morally responsible for our actions. This is also 
the line of reasoning I will develop in the following chapter. 
But first I want to draw attention to some empirical data 
from neuroscience and related fields that are important in 
relation to my argument.
Lessons from neuroscience
The question of whether and how free will and moral 
responsibility are compatible with findings from neurosci-
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ence and related fields (namely Libet, 1999; Wegner, 2002; 
Soon et al., 2008) constitutes one of the major questions 
within modern neuroethics. This question has been the 
subject of much debate during the recent years, as some 
scientists have argued that findings from neuroscience 
rule out free will and moral responsibility by showing that 
determinism is true at the brain level (e.g. Greene & Cohen, 
2004; Dawkins, 2006; Harris, 2012). However, many phi-
losophers have been quick to point to compatibilism (e.g. 
Morse, 2010; Roskies; 2006; Pardo & Patterson, forthcom-
ing) or questioned the conclusions that have been drawn 
from the empirical data (e.g. Mele, 2006; Dennett, 2011).
However, in this thesis I want to take a di'erent approach. 
I will argue that insights from neuroscience instead accen-
tuate the challenge of (constitutive) luck by showing that 
personality is largely dependent on the structure of the 
brain, namely the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala. The 
reason why neuroscience accentuates this challenge is that 
our neurological make-up influences our behavior in a 
much more salient way than e.g. our genetic inheritance or 
our upbringing. This is in part because our genes and up-
bringing influence our behavior through the brain (Greene 
& Cohen, 2004), and because our genetic inheritance and 
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upbringing are far removed from our actions in space and 
time, unlike the influence of our neurological make-up. In 
order to bolster this claim, I will begin by drawing atten-
tion to an unusual case from neurology involving a man, 
Alex, who became a pedophile a@er su'ering a brain tumor. 
I will then go on to touch upon the general connection 
between brain structure, personality, and behavior. 
An unusual case
The case about Alex is a remarkable one of a man who 
developed pedophilia as the result of a brain a tumor, first 
reported by Burns and Swerdlow (2003). Alex was a seem-
ingly normal man in his forties, who all of a sudden began 
to develop a strong interest in pornography, including child 
pornography. He started to frequent pornographic sites 
on the Internet, which lead to a beginning collection of 
pornographic material on his computer, in many cases fea-
turing children and youngsters. Soon a@erwards, he began 
to visit prostitutes and solicit sexual favors from strangers. 
He was allegedly embarrassed by all of this, but felt unable 
to stop. He managed to keep his behavior hidden for a 
couple of months, but was exposed when his prepubes-
cent stepdaughter told her mom that he had been making 
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subtle approaches towards her during the last couple of 
weeks. He was then removed from his home, diagnosed 
with pedophilia, and sentenced to either jail or rehabilita-
tion. He chose rehabilitation, of course, but was expelled 
from the program, as he kept making approaches towards 
the sta' and other patients. The night before he was to be 
transferred to prison he complained about a headache, and 
he had trouble with keeping his balance. He was then sub-
mitted to a MRI scan, which revealed a brain tumor in his 
cortex. A@er the tumor had been removed, his behavior re-
turned to normal, and he was allowed to return back home 
a@er completing the rehabilitation program. However, his 
problematic behavior returned a@er some months, and a 
new MRI scan revealed that the tumor had grown back. He 
then had a second operation, which removed the tumor 
and his problematic behavior once again.
Obviously, the story about Alex has raised a lot of discus-
sions—concerning both the legal and the neurological as-
pects of the case. But the story also raised an ethical discus-
sion in the media. Some people wondered whether people 
like Alex should be considered morally responsible for their 
actions, and some philosophers and legal scholars also took 
part in the debate. I will not go into this discussion here, 
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the point I want to make is that this case (and many oth-
ers) shows that personality is dependent on brain structure, 
neurotransmitters, etc. 
Now, some might say that cases like the above-mentioned 
cannot tell us anything about normal cases, as the case is 
obviously extraordinary. However, extraordinary cases can 
indeed tell us something about normal cases; for example, 
research on split-brain patients has revealed many things 
about the functions of the normal brain. But this objection 
really misses the point of the story; which is that who we 
are and what we do is largely a result of the structure of our 
brain. The case about Alex just accentuates this point. To 
make the point even clearer I want to add a few remarks on 
the general connection between brain structure, personality, 
and behavior.
Brain structure, personality, and behavior
When most people talk of personality they usually refer to 
something that one can have lots of and something one can 
lack—something that either makes one interesting or dull. 
However, within the field of psychology this term has a 
di'erent meaning. It “refers to important, enduring temper-
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amental traits along which people vary” (Wilson, 2012).
One influential theory of personality within psychology 
is the five-factor theory of personality. According to this 
theory, there are roughly five personality descriptors: (i) 
openness, (ii) conscientiousness, (iii) extraversion, (iv) 
agreeableness, and (v) neuroticism (McCrae & Costa, 2000). 
There is a rich psychological literature on these factors and 
how they relate to each other, and I will not go into depths 
with them here. However, a brief mention seems to be in 
order, as I want to note that these factors have been found 
to correlate with brain structure. 
(i) Openness is sometimes referred to as intellect and some-
times as openness to experience. People who score high on 
this trait tend to be artistic, curious, imaginative, insightful, 
original, and have a wide circle of interests. They are usually 
introspective and they tend to value intellectual matters. 
(ii) People who are conscientious tend to be e?cient, orga-
nized, planful, reliable, responsible (in the virtue sense), and 
thorough. They are usually good at delaying gratification, 
have high aspirations, tend to behave very ethically, and 
they are rarely self-indulgent.
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(iii) Extraverted people tend to be energetic, talkative, 
outgoing, enthusiastic, and assertive. They are o@en skilled 
in play, very humoristic, they have a high personal tempo, 
and they tend to seek excitement. They generally prefer the 
company of others to quiet time alone.
(iv) People who are agreeable tend to be appreciative, 
forgiving, generous, kind, trusting, and sympathetic. They 
o@en behave in a giving way, and they are usually not very 
critical or skeptical.  They also tend to have a modest nature, 
and they are generally tender-minded people.
(v) Neuroticism is a trait that is usually associated with anx-
iety and vulnerability. People who score high on this trait 
tend to be tense, touchy, worrying, self-pitying, and unstable. 
They are usually concerned with adequacy, they have fluc-
tuating moods, and they are generally thin-skinned people 
(McCrae & John, 1992). 
The important thing to note here is that, as mentioned, 
these five factors have been found to correlate with brain 
structure in a recent study by DeYoung et al. (2010). In this 
study, researchers used MRI scans to “test whether individu-
al variation in the volume of di'erent brain regions relates 
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to [di'erences in] personality” (DeYoung et al., 2010). The 
study found that:
Extraversion covaried with volume of the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region involved in pro-
cessing reward information. Agreeableness correlated 
with volume in areas that process information about 
the intentions and mental states of others (“mind-read-
ing”). Neuroticism went with a variety of brain regions 
associated with threat, punishment and negative a'ect, 
and Conscientiousness was associated with a larger 
prefrontal cortex (planning and voluntary control of 
behaviour) (DeYoung et al., 2010).
What this suggests is that the structure of our brain plays 
a very important role in how we are—and consequently 
in what we do. It seems as if the volume and functioning 
of di'erent regions in our brain plays an important role 
in forming our personality, and this tends to have a pro-
found impact on what we do with our lives. For example, it 
seems that having a large prefrontal cortex makes one more 
conscientious, and high conscientiousness has actually been 
associated with academic success (Conrad & Patry, 2012). 
On the other hand, low conscientiousness has been associ-
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ated with antisocial and criminal behavior (Ozer & Ben-
et-Martínez, 2006) as well as homelessness, unemployment, 
and imprisonment (Roberts, et al. 2009).
As should be clear, we do not control our own neurologi-
cal dispositions, e.g. the size of our own prefrontal cortex. 
Just like Alex was unlucky to su'er a brain tumor, some 
people are unlucky to have a small prefrontal cortex. And 
if these dispositions really play such an important role in 
forming our personality—as the evidence suggests—then 
it would seem like we do not really control who we are and 
consequently what we do—at least not in any important 
sense. This is the line of thought I will be developing in the 
following chapter. 
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The impossibility of moral              
responsibility
No man treats a motorcar as foolishly as he treats another 
human being. When the car will not go, he does not attribute its 
annoying behaviour to sin; he does not say, “You are a wicked 
motorcar, and I shall not give you any more petrol until you 
go.” He attempts to find out what is wrong and to set it right.          
—Russell
In light of the above quote, Russell would probably have 
wondered at the sight of Basil Fawlty beating his car in a fa-
mous scene from Fawlty Towers. The car would not start so 
Basil gave it a fair warning, counted to three, and proceeded 
to give the car a solid beating with a branch. In this chapter 
I will argue that we are all “beating cars” or “whipping the 
sea” when we say that someone is morally responsible for 
something and therefore deserves to su'er blame or pun-
ishment (or to be less happy). Likewise, I believe we are 
also making a mistake when we say that someone deserves 
praise or reward on basis of his or her actions. 
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In the following, I will discuss what I take to be the stron-
gest argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility, 
called the Basic Argument (Strawson, 1986; 1994; 1998, 
2011). As noted earlier, this argument roughly runs along 
the following lines: What we do is a result of who we are. 
To be truly morally responsible for what we do, we would 
therefore have to be truly morally responsible for who we 
are. But we cannot be truly morally responsible for who we 
are, because who we are—our character, personality, and 
motivational set—is a result of things outside our control. 
Therefore, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. 
I will begin by outlining and clarifying the premises of the 
argument and then go on to discuss what I take to be the 
strongest objections to the argument. I will argue that none 
of these objections succeed. 
Many people will undoubtedly find this argument unac-
ceptable, but personal experience tells me this will o@en be 
due to misunderstandings of what the argument implies. A 
few initial caveats therefore seem to be in order, before we 
get to the argument.
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A few caveats
For most people, the argument that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything will probably sound strange or 
contrived. The notion of moral responsibility is so deeply 
ingrained in our daily lives, our politics, and our institu-
tions, that the following argument will probably sound like 
something only a freshman philosophy major could enter-
tain. It will probably also seem impossible to most people 
to do without this notion, even if they could be convinced 
that it is wrong. With this in mind, I think it will be useful 
to clarify what the argument does and does not imply, so 
the argument can be read with a somewhat open mind. 
Firstly, the argument does not imply that people should 
never be held responsible for their actions, only that they 
are not morally responsible in any deep sense of that 
word—the sense that could make someone deserve to 
su'er blame or punishment (or to be less happy). Of course, 
dangerous criminals still need to be kept o' the streets, but 
we would also keep hurricanes and earthquakes “o' the 
streets” if we could—there is no need for moral responsibil-
ity for that. What the argument does imply is that people 
should only be blamed or punished for pragmatic reasons, 
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e.g. in order to influence their behavior or to prevent future 
crimes. 
Secondly, the argument does not imply that people cannot 
make decisions and act upon them—that the outcome 
is given no matter what one decides to do. This would 
amount to fatalism, “the view that we are powerless to do 
anything other than what we actually do” (Rice, 2010), but 
the argument implies nothing like that. What the argument 
does imply is that our decisions are a product of our charac-
ter, personality and motivational set, and that these factors 
ultimately depend on factors outside our control: our genes, 
upbringing, experiences, hormones, and neurological dispo-
sitions etc.  
Thirdly, the argument does not imply that people cannot 
change—they obviously can and they do, even though we 
all probably tend to overestimate our ability to change. 
What the argument does imply is that people cannot be 
expected to change in the sense that they deserve to su'er 
blame or punishment if they do not try or succeed, since 
whether or not people are inclined to change—and also 
the extent of their success—depends entirely on the factors 
mentioned above. 
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The Basic Argument
In the following sections I will outline and defend a version 
of the Basic Argument, an argument originally put forth 
by Strawson (1986), which is based on a line of reasoning 
adapted from both Nietzsche and Sidgwick. This argument 
has been stated in many ways, some more detailed than oth-
ers, but I believe the following captures the essence of the 
argument (Strawson, 1998, 2011):
(1)  What we do, in the situations we find ourselves in, is 
a result of who we are.
Hence,
(2)  To be truly morally responsible for what we do, we 
would therefore have to be truly morally responsi-
ble for how we are, at least with regards to certain 
crucial mental respects. 
But,
(3)  We cannot be truly morally responsible for how we 
are, as our character, personality, and motivational 
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set depends on factors outside our control. Conse-
quently we cannot be truly morally responsible for 
what we do.
Why? Because,
(4)  To be truly morally responsible for how we are, we 
would have to intentionally have brought it about 
that we are how we are, in a way that is impossible.
The impossibility can be shown as follows. Suppose that,
(5)  You have somehow intentionally brought it about 
that you are how you are—for example that you 
have a certain mental nature N—in a way that 
would make you truly morally responsible for hav-
ing nature N.
For this to be true,
(6)  You must already have had some mental nature N1, 
which lead you to intentionally bring it about that 
you now have nature N. (If this were not so, then N 
would not be the result of any intentions or prefer-
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ences, and you would not be truly morally responsi-
ble for having nature N in the first place.)
But then,
(7)  If you were to be truly morally responsible for 
having nature N, then you would have to be truly 
morally responsible for having nature N1, in light of 
which you intentionally brought it about that you 
have nature N.
So,
(8)  You must have intentionally brought it about that 
you have nature N1. But this leads to a potentially 
infinite regress, as you would also have to be truly 
morally responsible for having an earlier nature, N2, 
in light of which you brought it about that you had 
nature N1. And so on to infinity.
Therefore,
(9)  No one is ever truly morally responsible for any-
thing.
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So the argument goes. Even though the argument has 
“impressed so few”, in the words of a critic (Clarke, 2005:13), 
I think the above argument is quite reasonable. Of course, 
it is not immune to criticism, but before we get to some 
possible objections I want to note a couple of things about 
the argument.
The first thing to note is that, admittedly, there is nothing 
novel about the above argument. “Everything has been 
said before,” as André Gide said, “but since nobody listens 
we have to keep going back and beginning all over again” 
(Gide, 1978—quoted in Strawson, 1994). One exception 
though, as noted earlier, is the addition that findings from 
neuroscience make the above argument much more plausi-
ble.
The second thing to note about the argument is that what 
we do is, of course, not only a result of how we are. It is a 
well-known fact in psychology that what we do is largely 
the result of the features of the situations we are in. For 
example, studies have shown that whether or not people 
stop to help someone in need largely depends on whether 
or not they think they are in a hurry (Darley & Batson, 
1973). In light of studies like the above-mentioned it seems 
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clear that what we do is both a result of our personality and 
the features of the situations we are in, but since we clearly 
cannot control the features of the situations we are in, we 
can ignore situational factors for the present purpose.
Now, there are some possible objections one might reason-
ably make against the Basic Argument. Here I shall focus 
on what I take to be the three strongest objections. First-
ly, one might object that the argument relies on a faulty 
principle of reasoning: the principle of transfer of non-re-
sponsibility (tnr). Secondly, it might be objected that the 
argument relies on a too demanding notion of control, in 
the sense that the argument requires that we can control 
who we are. Thirdly, some may object that it can still be up 
to us whether or not a particular action happens—regard-
less of how we are. 
Objection 1: no transfer of non-responsibil-
ity
One objection that can be raised against the Basic Argu-
ment is that it relies on a faulty principle of reasoning: the 
transfer of non-responsibility. In this section I will present 
an example that purports to show that one can be morally 
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responsible for an action, even if one was not responsible 
for the factors that lead to the action. However, I shall reject 
this objection by arguing (i) that the example only works 
by trading on a consequentialist interpretation of moral 
responsibility, which is not the notion of responsibility 
in question, (ii) the objection appeals to an intuition that 
might be wrong, and (iii) even if this intuition was not 
mistaken, there are good reasons for revising this intuition 
instead of the principle of tnr. Firstly, I will touch upon the 
principle of transfer of non-responsibility.
The principle of tnr
The principle of tnr is mostly known from the works of 
Peter van Ingwagen (1983:184), and it works by transferring 
non-responsibility from one fact to another by the medium 
of a condition, which no one is responsible for. This princi-
ple can be laid out along the following lines: 
(tnr) If no one is responsible for the fact that p, and 
no one is responsible for the fact that if p then q, then 
no one is responsible for the fact that q. 
For example, if I am not responsible for the fact that the 
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bakery is out of cinnamon rolls (p), and if I am also not re-
sponsible for the fact that if the bakery is out of cinnamon 
rolls then my girlfriend will be disappointed (if p then q)—
then it seems doubtless that I am not responsible for the 
fact that my girlfriend will be disappointed (q). 
Or in the terms of the Basic Argument, if Lisa is not respon-
sible for the fact that she is how she is (p), and she is not 
responsible for the fact that if she is how she is then she 
does what she does (if p then q), then she is not responsible 
for the fact that she does what she does (q).
OAand, this principle seems unassailable. But according 
to Fisher and Ravizza (1998), the principle of tnr should 
be rejected as it leads to the wrong conclusion in some 
cases, where an agent is clearly responsible for an act—even 
though the principle of tnr says otherwise.
Betty and the avalanche
Consider for example the following case, called “Erosion” 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998:250f), which I will quote in 
length.
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In this example, Betty plants her explosives in the 
crevices of the glacier and detonates the charge at T1, 
causing an avalanche that crushes the enemy fortress 
at T3. Unbeknownst to Betty and her commanding 
o?cers, however, the glacier is gradually eroding (in a 
certain way). Had Betty not placed the dynamite in the 
crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken free at 
T2, starting an avalanche that would have crushed the 
enemy camp at T3. Here Betty is not morally responsi-
ble for the glacier’s erosion. And she is not responsible 
for the fact that, if the glacier erodes as it does, then 
the enemy camp will be destroyed by an avalanche at 
T3. And yet, in virtue of Betty’s freely detonating the 
explosives at T1, she is at least in part morally responsi-
ble for the enemy camp’s being destroyed at T3. Thus, 
Transfer NR must be rejected.
So the key point here is that Betty is not responsible for the 
erosion (p), and she is not responsible for the fact that if the 
glacier erodes then an avalanche destroys the enemy camp 
(if p then q), yet she is (at least in part) morally responsible 
for the destruction of the camp (q). 
Now, I do not think the example is clear. We might instead 
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say that she actually was responsible for detonating the 
explosives, and it is only therefore that we might think she 
was responsible for the destruction of the enemy fortress. 
Be that as it may, I am willing to grant this example for the 
sake of discussion. However, there are three reasons why 
I think this objection is unconvincing. Firstly, I think the 
example is trading on a consequentialist notion of responsi-
bility, which is not the notion of responsibility in question. 
If we think that Betty is responsible for her actions in the 
above case, it might simply be because it would have good 
consequences to hold her responsible. A@er all, she did her 
duty as a soldier, and she therefore might serve as a good 
example for other soldiers. No matter if she was morally 
responsible for the destruction of the enemy fortress, in any 
deep sense of the word, it might be good from a conse-
quentialist point of view to praise her. This would perhaps 
ensure that she would do her duty in the future and inspire 
other soldiers to do the same. Perhaps the above-mentioned 
considerations are really doing the work here, and in that 
case Betty would not really be morally responsible for 
destroying the enemy fortress, in the sense that could make 
her deserving of praise or blame without regards to any 
pragmatic reasons. 
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Secondly, even though it might be intuitive that Betty is 
morally responsible for destroying the enemy fortress, this 
intuition may simply be wrong. A lot of our intuitions are 
clearly wrong—for example, the intuition that the Earth 
does not move—the intuition that Betty is responsible 
might be one of them. Of course, it might be correct as 
well, but I do not think it should go without any argument, 
especially considering the fact that intuitions are not always 
widely shared. What could such an argument look like? 
Well, one could say that intuitions should be regarded as 
reliable unless we have a reason to doubt them. However, 
we do have a reason to doubt this intuition if the example 
is simply trading on a consequentialist notion of moral 
responsibility. Besides, as I shall argue in the following 
chapter, there are lots of reasons to doubt our intuitions 
about free will and moral responsibility, and these reasons 
can also be seen as reasons to doubt the reliability of the 
above intuition. One could also argue that the above intu-
ition should be regarded as reliable, because it is universally 
held. However, being a skeptic about the notions of free 
will and moral responsibility, I do not find it intuitive that 
Betty is morally responsible for destroying the enemy for-
tress, so this intuition is definitely not universally held. This 
could of course be contrived on my part, but I doubt that I 
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am the only one who does not find the example intuitively 
convincing. 
Thirdly, even if this intuition was not mistaken, there are 
still two good reasons to uphold the principle of tnr 
instead of the intuition that Betty is morally responsible 
for destroying the enemy fortress. The first reason is that 
the principle of tnr has a lot of intuitive force, and it is not 
obvious that there are any reasons to doubt the reliability of 
the intuitions in favor of this principle. What should moti-
vate anybody to mistakenly believe in the principle of tnr? 
What cognitive bias should make us favor this principle 
over the intuitions about moral responsibility? It seems to 
me like the principle of tnr is a somewhat neutral premise 
that leads to a controversial and highly charged conclusion, 
because we have a lot of emotions invested in the notions 
of free will and moral responsibility. But the fact that it 
leads to a controversial conclusion is not grounds for dis-
missing the principle. Instead it should lead us to doubt the 
notions of free will and moral responsibility. 
The second reason why I think we should uphold the 
principle of tnr instead of the intuitions in counterexam-
ples like “Erosion,” is that this principle seems to be built 
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into the very notion of moral responsibility. Consider for 
example the case of someone who has been brainwashed as 
a child. I think it is safe to say that most people would not 
consider such a person morally responsible for her actions. 
But such an excuse seems to rely on precisely the princi-
ple of tnr. Why should e.g. a brainwashed person not be 
regarded as morally responsible if not for something like 
the principle of tnr? In this way I think that the principle 
of tnr is somewhat prior to intuitions about moral respon-
sibility, and it seems that a rejection of this principle would 
also jettison some important parts of the notion of moral 
responsibility, namely some excuses—like the excuse one 
would have if one had been brainwashed. Therefore, even 
proponents of the notion of moral responsibility may have 
good reason not to reject the principle of tnr.
In conclusion, the objection that the Basic Argument relies 
on a faulty principle of reasoning (the principle of tnr) is 
unconvincing, as the example that was meant to discredit 
the principle seems to be trading on a consequentialist in-
terpretation of moral responsibility. It is also not clear that 
the example appeals to an intuition that is reliable. Further-
more, there is good reason to uphold this principle instead 
of the intuitions that should allegedly lead us to reject the 
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principle of tnr, as the principle of tnr has a lot of intui-
tive force. Even proponents of the notion of moral respon-
sibility might have good reason to uphold the principle of 
tnr, as this principle seems to be built into the very notion 
of moral responsibility.
Objection 2: the cards we are dealt
Besides the objection that the Basic Argument relies on a 
faulty principle of reasoning, one could also object that this 
argument, more specific the third premise, relies on a too 
demanding notion of control. It is easy to show the impos-
sibility of something if you set the bar high enough. For 
example, it is easy to show that Denmark never had a good 
national soccer team if the criterion is that only winners of 
the World Cup are good national teams. But it is arguably 
unreasonable to set the bar this high. Might the same thing 
be said about the Basic Argument? That the argument sets 
the bar for moral responsibility unreasonably high? Some 
people think so. 
One of the people who have criticized the Basic Argument 
for being too demanding is Fischer (2006). To use an anal-
ogy of Fischer’s: moral responsibility has to do with how 
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we decide to play the hands we were dealt. We do not need 
to be the ones who dealt the cards, made the rules of the 
game, owned the factory that made the cards and so forth 
(Fischer, 2006). It is simply too much to demand that we 
should have control over our genes, upbringing, neurolog-
ical make-up and so forth, in order to be morally responsi-
ble for our actions. What we need is simply to be in control 
of our immediate actions, not all the causal contributors to 
whatever we do. In this section I argue that this objection 
relies on a straw man (following Istvan, 2011), as the Basic 
Argument does not claim that we need to control all the 
factors that influence our actions, only the slight sliver that 
leads us to act. Firstly, I will touch upon the notion of total 
control, which Fischer (mistakenly) believes that the Basic 
Argument relies on.
The notion of total control
According to Fischer, the Basic Argument relies on the 
mistaken idea that one can only be morally responsible 
for an action if one has total control over that action. 
This amounts to “metaphysical megalomania” (Fischer, 
2006:116), as this notion cannot be satisfied. To see this, 
consider the notion of total control (tc): 
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tc: An agent has total control over X only if for any 
factor f which is a causal contributor to X and which 
is such that if f were not to occur, then X would not 
occur, the agent has control over f (ibid.). 
Surely this notion of control is hyperbolic and impossible 
to satisfy. One would have to control the rising of the sun, 
the oxygen level in the air, and so forth, in order to be mor-
ally responsible, as these are all causal contributors to any of 
our actions—if they did not occur then our actions would 
not occur. However, as I shall argue in the following, the Ba-
sic Argument does not rely on such a hyperbolic notion of 
control. Although the objection may seem quite reasonable 
oAand, I believe it can be shown to be a straw man. 
Not total control, but modest control
To show that this objection is really a straw man, I will ex-
pand on the notion of responsibility employed by the Basic 
Argument. According to premise (2), to be morally respon-
sible for an action, one needs to be morally responsible for 
how one is—at least with regards to certain crucial mental 
respects— the “crucial portion being what makes the di'er-
ence whether or not the action happens” (Istvan, 2011:400). 
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For example, Peter does not need to be responsible for—or 
in control of—having legs in order to be responsible for 
deliberately kicking Paul, but he does need to be responsi-
ble for the character and motives that explain his decision 
to kick Paul. Presumably, it is Peter’s character and motives 
that make the di'erence whether he kicks Paul or not, so it 
is his character and motives that he should be responsible 
for—not the fact that he has legs.
To further expand on this point, for an agent to be morally 
responsible for an action, the action must issue from said 
agent, in the sense that the action issues from how the 
agent is at the time of the action. Now, the agent does not 
have to be morally responsible for his or her entire consti-
tution at the time of the action in order to be responsible 
for that action—that would definitely be too demanding. 
The agent only needs to be responsible for her mental 
constitution (since we are dealing with intentional action 
when discussing moral responsibility). Importantly, the 
agent does not even need to be responsible for every part of 
her mental constitution that grounds or inclines the action 
in question. The agent only needs to be responsible for that 
crucial part of her mental constitution that has her perform 
the action (Strawson, 2002:445). 
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Consider the following story to see how an agent could still 
be morally responsible for an action even though the agent 
was not responsible for whatever aspects of her mental con-
stitution that grounded (provided the reason for) and in-
clined (encouraged) the action (Istvan, 2011:402). Imagine 
a young boy, called Ludvig, who is afraid of the dark. Since 
Ludvig’s mom does not want him to be scared, she has 
been letting him sleep with the lights turned on. Although 
Ludvig is somewhat happy with his mother’s sheltering, he 
really wants to rid himself of this fear, believing it to be silly 
and childish. He also believes that sleeping an entire night 
in the dark will help him achieve his goal. One evening he 
forms the intention of sleeping in the dark and a@er his 
mother leaves his room, he walks up to the wall socket. 
Now, according to the notion of moral responsibility 
employed in the Basic Argument, Ludvig could still be 
morally responsible for choosing to sleep in the dark even 
though he did not, we can assume, choose the reasons and 
attitudes on which he acted: believing his fear to be silly, 
desiring to rid himself of his fear, and believing that sleep-
ing an entire night in the dark will make him achieve his 
goal. Although these reasons and attitudes grounded and 
inclined his action, he does not need to be responsible for 
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them to be responsible for his action. While these parts of 
his mental constitution were not up to him, it still could be 
up to him whether having these (non-chosen) reasons and 
attitudes meant that he would actually do as he did (Istvan, 
2011:402). All he needs to be responsible for is that sliver 
of his mental constitution that has him decide how to act 
(Strawson, 1986:57).
Indeed, it would be excessive to demand that our reasons 
(beliefs and desires) should be up to us when they ground 
an action, in order for us to be responsible for that action; 
because our beliefs are o@en (or so we should hope) a prod-
uct of “how things are” (Strawson, 1986:43); and our desires 
are never really up to us, as they are cultivated from earlier 
desires going back to a point at which they were definitely 
not up to us (Strawson, 1986:49).
But how can moral responsibility be an impossibility if all 
one needs to be responsible for is the small sliver of one’s 
mental constitution that has one decide how to act? Well, 
for one to be morally responsible for that sliver one must 
have intentionally brought that sliver about. But to do that 
requires prior mental constitution. And one would also 
need to be responsible for the small sliver of that mental 
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constitution that brought the first sliver about. As should 
be clear, one is then snagged by the regress. 
In conclusion, what the above shows is that, contrary to 
what Fischer claims, the Basic Argument does not rely on 
anything like the notion of total control. Indeed, the argu-
ment actually relies on a quite modest notion of control. To 
be morally responsible for an action one only needs to be 
responsible for—or in control of—the slight sliver of one’s 
mental constitution that has one decide how to act. But 
even this modest notion of control cannot be satisfied.
Objection 3: No matter who you are…
One critic who has not “been persuaded by the argument” 
is Clarke, who claims that the Basic Argument assumes an 
implicit premise that is not accepted by its critics—and 
unless they are convinced of the truth of this premise, they 
will not be persuaded by the argument (Clarke, 2005:13). 
What is this implicit premise? 
The (not so) hidden premise
According to Clarke, the Basic Argument implicitly as-
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sumes the truth of the following premise: “When you do 
what you do because of the way you are, it is not possible 
for it to be up to you whether if you are that way, in cer-
tain crucial mental respects, then you perform that action” 
(Clarke, 2005:19). At least some (libertarians) deny this 
premise, as they hold that it is possible for it to be up to 
an agent whether or not she performs a given action, no 
matter what her mental constitution is. 
I think it is worth noticing that the above premise is not at 
all implicit or hidden in the Basic Argument, contrary to 
what Clarke claims. The second premise of the argument 
states that one has to be morally responsible for how one 
is, at least in certain crucial aspects, in order to be morally 
responsible for what one does—which means that one 
has to be morally responsible for the part of one’s mental 
constitution that leads one to act. So while it can be up to 
oneself if an action follows from one’s mental constitution, 
one needs to be responsible for the sliver of one’s mental 
constitution that leads one to act, and it is for this reason 
that one is snagged by the regress.
A distinction might be helpful to further illustrate what the 
disagreement is about here. It seems that there are two ways 
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an agent might be morally responsible, which are at stake 
in the discussion. Either (i) at least some part of the mental 
constitution that leads Peter to perform an action is up to 
him, or (ii) even though no part of the mental constitution 
that leads Peter to act is up to him, it is up to him whether 
that action follows from that mental constitution (a dis-
tinction adopted from Istvan, 2011:414). I think Clarke is 
correct in saying that only (i) is accepted by proponents of 
the Basic Argument, while some critics accept (ii). However, 
I do not think Clarke is correct in saying that (ii) is either 
plausible or coherent, as (ii) implies that an action can be 
up to an agent even when no contributing factor to said 
action was up to the agent. This leads to the odd conclusion 
that an agent can be morally responsible for something that 
was entirely not up to that agent—e.g. a lightning strike 
or an earthquake! There is also another reason why I think 
Clarke’s objection is unconvincing. I think the objection 
relies on an unreliable intuition—which is based on our 
common experience of being free and morally responsible, 
an experience that cannot just be assumed to be veridical; a 
point I shall expand upon in the following chapter. 
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The actions of strangers
Let me expand on the first point a bit. To say that an agent 
can be morally responsible for an action even though no 
contributing factor was up to said agent is basically saying 
that an agent can be morally responsible for something 
said agent did not have any part in. For example, an agent 
could be morally responsible for something like a lightning 
strike or an earthquake, seeing as the agent does not need 
to be responsible for whatever contributes to the outcome 
in question. Of course, it might be objected that agents can 
only be responsible for intentional actions, but this will 
not help. If an agent could be responsible for intentional 
actions that she did not have any part in, then she could be 
responsible for the actions of a complete stranger, which is 
arguably absurd (Istvan, 2011:415). One has no control over 
a stranger’s actions, so one cannot possibly satisfy the con-
trol condition in such a case. Also, if one could be morally 
responsible for an action one had no part in, one could po-
tentially be responsible for everything and nothing, leaving 
the notion of moral responsibility in a blur.
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An unreliable intuition
With regards to the second reason why I think Clarke’s 
objection is unconvincing, I think this objection relies 
on an unreliable intuition, based on a phenomenological 
experience that should not be assumed to be veridical. As 
noted, I will expand on this point in the following chapter, 
but let me just mention a couple of reasons why I think we 
should be cautious about taking our immediate experienc-
es as veridical. 
There is an abundance of psychological literature on the 
limits and unreliability of our access to our own mental 
states generally, and the same seems to apply to our access 
to our own experience. A couple of examples: being paid 
a small sum to tell somebody that a task in which one has 
just participated was fun leads one to think one enjoyed 
it—even though the task was boring and repetitive (Fest-
inger & Carlsmith, 1959). When choosing between items 
that are really identical, one is o@en lead to think that one 
has detected di'erences between them (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). When one exercises prior to meeting someone of the 
opposite sex, one o@en rates this person as more attractive 
(Allen et al., 1989). All of these studies—and many more—
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suggests that we are really not that good at assessing the 
causes and character of our experience, which should make 
us cautious of taking our experience at face value. 
However, there is another way one could state Clarke’s ob-
jection, and perhaps this way would be more favorable. To 
conclude this section I will state the objection in this more 
favorable way. However, I still think the objection fails.
Begging the question?
Now, to be more favorable to Clarke, one could say that 
the Basic Argument simply begs the question by assuming 
that what we do is a result of who we are. Because does 
this not assume what was set out to be proven—that we 
do not have free will? Could our actions not simply be the 
result of our free will instead of our character, personality, 
and motivational set? I do not think so. Suppose that you 
do have a free choice as a rational agent about whether or 
not you will perform a certain action, A (given that you 
have a certain character, personality and motivational set). 
How would you then choose between A and ¬A? It seems 
like there are only two ways you could make that choice. 
You either make a choice that is guided by your character, 
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personality, and motivational set, or you make a choice that 
is guided by nothing. In the former case you are snagged 
by the regress, as you cannot be morally responsible for 
your character, personality, and motivational set. These all 
depend on factors outside your control. In the latter case 
your choice would be random, which would mean that 
it was not really a choice at all—or at least it would not 
be an apt candidate for moral evaluation. A choice that is 
completely random would not really be chosen—it would 
make more sense to say that it just happened to you. Even 
if we say that your character, personality, and motivational 
set just partially guided you—if these factors inclined your 
choice without necessitating it (as Leibniz would say)—
your choice would just end up being partially guided and 
partially random. This would not really improve on the two 
options (Parks, 2009).
Put di'erently: when we make a decision we either choose 
one thing over another due to a reason, an inclination, or 
by random. In the first case, there are two ways one can 
go about things. One either weighs one’s reasons or one 
weights them (Nozick, 1981; Levy, 2007). When we weigh 
our reasons, we try to find out how significant they are for 
us in light of our “beliefs, values, plans, goals, and desires.” 
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When we weight our reasons, we assign them certain 
significance—disregarding or varying any significance they 
already had (Levy, 2007:234). For example, if Peter is delib-
erating about studying abroad or staying home, he can try 
to find out how significant studying abroad is to him—how 
much will he miss his family, will it su?ce to speak with 
his girlfriend on the telephone during his stay, and so on. 
In that case he is weighing his reasons. He can also choose 
to ignore or vary the weight that closeness to his family 
and girlfriend has for him, and if nothing about his other 
reasons explains this choice he is weighting his reasons. 
When we deliberate, we typically weigh our reasons—we do 
not weight them. Of course, Peter might want to make his 
family matter less to him —perhaps he has a wish not to 
be tied down, but in that case he is not really weighting his 
reasons, but instead he is indirectly weighing them (ibid.). 
The point here is that we do not control what reasons 
weigh heavier with us, as this comes down to our mental 
constitution (and we have already seen how we cannot be 
responsible for our mental constitution). And we cannot 
be responsible for weighting our reasons either. The reason 
for this is that if nothing about our reasons explains our 
weighting, then it is random—something that just happens 
to us. Consequently, such a decision would not really be an 
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apt candidate for moral evaluation. Likewise, we cannot be 
responsible for our inclinations, as these obviously depend 
on our mental constitution, and if our choice is purely 
random—which seems to be the last possible option—then 
it is not really a choice, and we cannot be responsible for it 
either.
To further expand on this point, consider if someone had 
the power to manipulate your character, beliefs, and desires, 
for example, with the use of neurochemistry, and they ma-
nipulated you to have murderous inclinations, to think in a 
certain way and so on. Would you then be morally respon-
sible for carrying out a murder? It seems like Clarke is com-
mitted to say yes. If it is true that we are always completely 
free to choose our actions no matter who we are, then this 
kind of manipulation would not chip away at our freedom 
of will. But that seems like an odd thing to say.
In conclusion, the objection that I have discussed in this 
section is unconvincing as it leads to an absurd conclu-
sion: that people can be morally responsible for the acts 
of strangers. It also seems to be based on an unreliable 
intuition, grounded in a phenomenological experience that 
should not be assumed to be veridical. In other terms, the 
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Basic Argument does not beg the question, as it seems clear 
that one’s choices are either guided by one’s mental consti-
tution or nothing at all. In the former case one is snagged 
by the regress, and in the latter case it is not really a choice 
at all. Furthermore, if it was truly up to us what to do, no 
matter who we are, then certain kinds of manipulation that 
appears to rule out moral responsibility would not chip 
away at our freedom of will at all. But this leads to the odd 
conclusion that victims of manipulation are still morally 
responsible for what they do even though they did not 
choose to be manipulated and even though they cannot 
satisfy the control condition.
Concluding remarks
Before we reach the next chapter, in which I will counter a 
somewhat indirect objection to the argument I have been 
discussing in the preceding sections: that the argument is 
contrary to common experience, I want to close this chap-
ter o' with a few concluding remarks.
In the previous chapter I argued that luck pose a challenge 
to the notions of free will and moral responsibility, and it 
should be clear by now why that is. We do not create our 
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own character, and what we do is a result of who we are (as 
well as situational factors etc.). And so what we do is really 
just a matter of (constitutive) luck. 
If one wants to challenge the line of thought that I have 
been pursuing in this chapter, I suspect that one would 
need to find an argument that can support the idea that it 
is ultimately up to oneself whether a certain action follows 
from one’s mental constitution. Notably, it must be an 
argument that can properly deal with the problems I have 
pointed out. As will (hopefully) be clear in the following 
chapter, this argument should also avoid appealing to our 
common experience of being free and morally responsi-
ble, or at least provide a good reason why this experience 
should be taken as veridical. 
Another possibility would be to find a good argument for 
the view that our mental constitution is indeed up to us. 
Of course, it seems impossible to successfully argue that 
we can ever be the ultimate cause of ourselves, but perhaps 
less can su?ce. Perhaps one could argue that our mental 
constitution is a result of both our own conscious e'ort 
and factors that are clearly beyond our control—just like 
two people leaning against each other’s back. Maybe one 
87
could somehow stop the infinite regress with such an argu-
ment. That remains to be seen. Until then I think there are 
better arguments for the view that we can never be morally 
responsible for anything. 
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An error theory of moral               
responsibility
Don’t think of an elephant!
In the preceding chapter I argued that no one is ever mor-
ally responsible for anything, in the sense that could make 
one deserve to su'er blame or punishment (or to be less 
happy). The obvious response to this is that we nevertheless 
feel free and morally responsible, and the best theory is 
the one that fits best with experience. The objective of this 
chapter is therefore to explain away this experience, in or-
der to undermine our commonsensical beliefs in the reality 
of free will and moral responsibility. In this way I want to 
counter a possible objection to my argument, an objection 
that is based on our immediate experience of being free 
and morally responsible.
To do this I will present some psychological reasons for why 
we might feel free and responsible even though we are not. 
Here I will focus on four reasons. Firstly, I will suggest that 
a large part of our beliefs in free will and moral responsi-
bility might simply be due to wishful thinking. Secondly, I 
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will suggest that our beliefs in free will and moral responsi-
bility might also in part be due to what social psychologists 
call ‘the fundamental attribution error’ or ‘the correspon-
dence bias’. Thirdly, in a similar vein, I will suggest that 
another cognitive bias called ‘the just world fallacy’ might 
also play a large role in our beliefs in free will and moral 
responsibility. Fourthly, I will argue that even though we 
might feel free and responsible in a situation of choice, 
there are good reasons not to assume that our immediate 
experiences are veridical, as I also noted in the preceding 
chapter. These four reasons will be presented and discussed 
in the following sections.
Although the experience of being free and responsible 
may seem inescapable, I believe that we also experience the 
opposite at times. For example, if you are like most people, 
you probably thought of an elephant at the beginning of 
this chapter, no matter how hard you tried not to—and you 
are probably doing it again right now. Also, most of us have 
probably found ourselves repeating the mistakes of our par-
ents, no matter how hard we have tried not to. However, in 
this chapter I want to go beyond our immediate experienc-
es and look at some empirical evidence. If it can be shown 
that some kind of cognitive bias is really doing the heavy 
90
li@ing when it comes to our beliefs in free will and moral 
responsibility, this might help push the debate forward—
perhaps even more so than what any direct argument can 
do. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the following 
reasons are decisive in any way. What I am suggesting is 
that they all chip away at our confidence in being free and 
morally responsible.
I wish I was a little bit taller…
One of the reasons why we believe in free will and moral 
responsibility might simply be due to wishful thinking—a 
cognitive bias also known as the desirability bias. Many 
studies have confirmed that we tend to think something is 
more likely to be true if we want it to be so (Kunda, 1990; 
Balcetis, 2007; Roese & Olson, 2007). This seems especially 
to be the case when it is our own self-image that is on the 
line (Krizan & Windschitl, 2009). On the face of things, the 
notions of free will and moral responsibility could easily 
be a product of this bias, as people generally prefer to view 
themselves and each other as free and responsible beings.
Before we get into this cognitive bias, I think it is worth-
while to mention why we might want to believe in free will 
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and moral responsibility. Is it not much easier and com-
fortable to just deny freedom and responsibility? To never 
be morally responsible for anything? There is no doubt 
that we some times might prefer to believe that we are not 
free and morally responsible, as such a belief can give us 
relief and help us deal with our shortcomings. For example, 
if I get a bad grade for my thesis, I could just tell myself 
that it was not really my fault—that I was somehow just 
unlucky. This would arguably be much more comfortable 
than believing the poor grade was due to something I had 
control over. But then why say that our beliefs in free will 
and moral responsibility might be due to wishful thinking 
when the opposite could be true as well? 
I think there are three good reasons why our beliefs in free 
will and moral responsibility are much more likely to be 
a product of wishful thinking than the view that we are 
not free and responsible. Firstly, I think we all prefer to see 
ourselves as the captain of the ship, instead of a slave to the 
weather, as this gives us a sense of control over our lives. 
With this sense of control comes a sense of security—our 
life is in our own hands, so we alone decide what to make 
of it. Although this freedom might provoke anxiety, as 
Kierkegaard would say, it is arguably nothing against the 
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anxiety that might be provoked if we were to realize that 
we are not really captains of the ship. Secondly, I think we 
like to consider each other and ourselves as free and respon-
sible, because we like to think that we deserve the fruits 
of our achievements, and that the less fortunate deserve 
their misery—a point I will expand on in relation to the 
just world fallacy. If people are responsible for their own 
misfortunes we (arguably) have fewer obligations towards 
them, on a commonsense view, which could make one have 
a preference for believing in moral responsibility. Thirdly, 
most people like to think that we humans are unique—that 
we are of a special kind, and that we are superior to other 
species. This, I reckon, is the teaching of most religions, at 
least as they are popularly understood. The idea of free will 
and moral responsibility helps to make us special.
Wishful thinking and moral responsibility
When I am talking about wishful thinking, I am using this 
term in a broad sense for all types of motivated reasoning, 
and not in its more specific sense where it is usually restrict-
ed to forecasts. In this broad sense, wishful thinking (or the 
desirability bias) simply means that a strong wish, desire, or 
preference for a specific outcome inflates optimism about 
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that outcome (Krizan & Windschitl, 2009). This phenome-
non is well known in social psychology, and there are many 
studies of wishful thinking in psychological literature. Here 
are just a few examples: when watching a game of football, 
people are more likely to see a call from the referee as cor-
rect when it favors the team they want to see win (Hastorf 
& Cantril, 1954). When people do well on a test they tend 
to evaluate that test as more valid than if they did bad on 
the test (Wyer & Frey, 1983). If a claim suggests a negative 
outcome for someone, they usually tend to downplay its 
convincingness (Kunda, 1987). 
These and many other examples all suggest that we o@en 
fail to reason in an objective way, and that we o@en do so to 
enhance or protect a desirable self-view (Krizan & Wind-
schitl, 2009). Of course, a view cannot be dismissed as wish-
ful thinking just because it is desirable, but the evidence 
suggests that we should be especially cautious of wishful 
thinking when it is our self-view that is on the line. That 
certainly seems to be the case when we are talking about 
free will and moral responsibility. So much for wishful 
thinking, I will now turn to the fundamental attribution 
error.
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Vinnie and The Situation
Imagine a man at the gym—lets call him Vinnie. As Vinnie 
li@s a barbell one of the weights falls o', as he enters the 
shower he trips, and as he drinks a cup of co'ee a@er his 
workout he spills all over the floor. Now, the obvious thing 
to conclude from this story is that we are dealing with a 
clumsy man. What else could explain Vinnie’s mishaps? 
The answer is: the situation. In this section I will present 
evidence that people routinely draw inferences about some-
one’s character or dispositions from behavior that can be 
entirely explained by the features of the situations in which 
the behavior occurs. This cognitive bias is called the funda-
mental attribution error (or the correspondence bias). In 
the above story, could it not just as easily have been the case 
that the barbell was broken, that someone had spilled soap 
on the floor in the shower, and that the co'ee was surpris-
ingly hot? In the following I will argue that this cognitive 
bias might also be at play when it comes to our beliefs in 
free will and moral responsibility. Firstly, I will expand on 
this cognitive bias and give some examples of how it works. 
Secondly, I will elaborate on how this bias can help explain 
away our beliefs in free will and moral responsibility. 
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The fundamental attribution error
As noted, people o@en fail to consider how situational 
features contribute to or determine their own or other 
people’s actions. (This is especially true in regards to other 
people—we are less blind of the situation when it is our 
own behavior on the line.) We usually just assume that the 
person and not the situation was the decisive factor in a giv-
en outcome. This “tendency is one of the most fundamental 
phenomena in [social psychology]” (Gilbert & Malone, 
1995), and there is a rich literature on this cognitive bias.
A couple of examples: In one experiment subjects were as-
signed at random to play the role of quizmaster, contestant, 
or observer. It was clear to all that the quizmaster made 
up the questions from his or her area of expertise and that 
the questions were very di?cult. Nevertheless, observers 
routinely judged the contestants to be not so bright—even 
though they knew the contestants had been assigned to 
play a disadvantaged role (Ross et al., 1977). In another 
study, basketball players were randomly assigned to shoot 
free throws in either a badly or a properly lighted court. 
Players who were assigned to shoot in a badly lighted court 
were then judged to be less capable players than players 
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who were assigned to shoot on a properly lighted court—
even though observers knew that the former players could 
not see properly (referenced in Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In 
a third study subjects were asked to evaluate whether the 
writer of an essay (which was either written in favor of or 
against Castro) was either pro- or anti-Castro. Even when 
the subjects knew that the writer of the essay did not have 
a choice in whether the essay had to be pro- or anti-Castro, 
they judged the essay to be reflective of the writer’s attitude 
(Jones & Harris, 1967).
These studies suggest that people routinely attribute charac-
teristics, traits, and abilities to agents, when the features of 
the situation could just as easily explain the agent’s behav-
ior. Why do we do this? Well, this is apparently a matter of 
controversy, but Gilbert and Malone suggest four causes of 
this bias (1995:): (i) Lack of awareness. Usually, we do not 
have full information about the constraints people face in 
a specific situation. As mentioned, Vinnie’s mishaps could 
just as easily have been due to situational features. Lacking 
the proper information we just assume that the fault lied 
with Vinnie and not the situation. (ii) Unrealistic expecta-
tions. Even if we understand that Vinnie’s circumstances 
were not really favorable to him, we might still hold strong 
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opinions about his character. This is because we are not that 
good at predicting the behavior of others (or ourselves) in 
a given situation. Consequently we have unrealistic expec-
tations. We might think that anyone in their right senses 
would have checked the barbell, been more careful in the 
shower, and realized that co'ee can be very hot sometimes. 
(iii) Inflated categorizations. Even when we have perfect 
information and realistic expectations we might still not 
judge someone’s behavior accurately. This is because our in-
formation and expectations influence what we perceive. For 
example, we might think that Vinnie was clumsy precisely 
because we know about the constraints he faced. We expect 
him to trip on the slippery floor, and this can make his be-
havior seem especially clumsy. In this way, our expectations 
can actually inflate the categorization of someone’s behav-
ior. (iv) Incomplete corrections. When we try to under-
stand others, we usually begin by drawing a spontaneous 
inference about the dispositions of their person, and only 
a@erwards do we correct that inference if it seems uncalled 
for. But when our minds are busy with other things we 
fail to revise our mistakes. For example, an observer might 
remember that many of the barbells in the gym are broken, 
but nevertheless be too busy thinking about an upcoming 
deadline at work to correct her judgment of Vinnie.
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The fundamental attribution error and moral                
responsibility
Judging from the above experiments, it seems clear that we 
tend to put too much emphasis on the role of the person 
while not recognizing the influence of situational features. 
How might insight into this cognitive bias help explain 
away our beliefs in free will and moral responsibility? 
Well, as noted, the above experiments suggest that we o@en 
make the mistake of attributing behavior to the features of 
a specific agent, when this behavior was really caused by the 
situation. In other words, we o@en fail to recognize that ev-
erybody in the exact same circumstances would have done 
exactly the same. In this way the fundamental attribution 
error may be driving or inflating, at least in part, our beliefs 
in free will and moral responsibility. Although it may seem 
obvious to an observer that the buck stopped with the 
agent, the evidence suggests that this is o@en not the case. 
This should make us cautious of attributing a certain behav-
ior to a specific agent who is o@en just a victim or a benefi-
ciary of the circumstances. We should especially be cautious 
since the conditions in the above-mentioned experiments 
were somewhat exaggerated and salient—we can expect the 
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situational features of real life to be even subtler and less 
noticeable. 
Besides, if we can be thus blind to the influence of the sit-
uation—which is arguably right there in front of us—then 
it seems likely that we are even blinder to the influences of 
our genes, upbringing, past experiences, and neurological 
make-up which are hidden from our view. Just like situa-
tional features can influence behavior, it seems clear that 
these factors can also influence what we do. But does it real-
ly make sense to say that an agent deserves to su'er for his 
or her actions if everybody with the exact same genes, up-
bringing, past experiences or neurological make-up would 
have done exactly the same as said agent? Of course, people 
who believe in (libertarian) free will doubt that everybody 
would do exactly the same in the exact same circumstances, 
as free will is taken to be the x factor here. But this flies in 
the face of the above evidence. I will now turn to the just 
world fallacy.
Justice will prevail
Most of us have probably at some point observed someone 
getting what was coming to them and thought: “what goes 
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around comes around” or “you reap what you sow.” These 
idioms express what social psychologists refer to as ‘the 
just world fallacy’—the (false) belief that the world is a just 
place where everyone gets their just deserts. We think this 
way because we prefer to live in a just world where the bad 
guy loses and the good guy wins, and therefore we o@en 
bend the realities to fit with this desire.
A classic example of the just world fallacy comes from the 
story of Job, which appears in the Book of Job from the 
Hebrew Bible. In this story we hear about Job who is a very 
righteous man. But God nevertheless puts Job’s faith to the 
test, and he su'ers a great deal of misfortunes: his children 
die, much of his property is destroyed, and he is infected 
with sore boils from top to toe. When three of his friends 
come to see him, one of them suggests that Job must have 
done something wrong in order to deserve his misfortunes 
(Book of Job, 8:21).
In the following I pursue the thought that this cognitive 
bias motivates us to regard each other and ourselves as free 
and morally responsible agents. This is because the world 
would not be just if our actions were not really up to us in 
any deep sense—poor people would not be poor through 
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any faults of their own (e.g. because they are lazy), and the 
rich and successful would likewise not deserve the fruits of 
their labor. I shall begin by elaborating on this fallacy, and 
then I will expand on how this cognitive bias might help 
explain away our beliefs in free will and moral responsibil-
ity.
Blaming the victim
According to the theory behind the just world fallacy, peo-
ple have a strong desire to live in a just world. This is in part 
because such a world simply appears to be the better alter-
native, and because we like to think that good deeds will be 
rewarded and that bad deeds will be punished. Consequent-
ly, we tend to think that bad things only happen to bad 
people. This gives us a sense of control over our lives—be 
nice and good things will follow. When we are faced with 
evidence to the contrary, we either try to fix the injustice or 
persuade ourselves that no injustice has really happened—
by blaming the victim (Lerner & Miller, 1978:1030f). For 
example, we tell ourselves that victims of violence probably 
provoked their attacker, that the unemployed are probably 
lazy, and that the ill probably failed to live in a healthy way. 
This fallacy is o@en reinforced in movies, fairy tales, novels, 
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comics, and other tales of morality where the man in the 
white hat brings the man in the black hat to justice.
In fact, we o@en blame ourselves as well when things 
go wrong. For example, victims of violence o@en blame 
themselves for either causing the violence, not being able to 
modify the violence, or for tolerating the violence (Mill-
er & Porter, 1983). Victims of illness also tend to blame 
themselves for either causing the illness or failing to heal 
themselves (Kainz, 2003). The bias runs that deep, which is 
important to note, as it is our common experience of being 
free and morally responsible that is the subject of discus-
sion here.
The psychologists Melvin Lerner and Carolyn Simmons 
did a pioneering study on this fallacy in the 1960s. In this 
study subjects watched a woman getting shocked when 
she failed to answer correct on various questions. Or so the 
subjects were lead to believe—the woman only pretended 
to be shocked. A@erwards, when the subjects were asked to 
describe the woman they tended to devalue her, they spoke 
negatively about her character and appearance, and said 
that she got what was coming to her (Lerner & Simmons, 
1966). 
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In another study, subjects thought they were being paired 
up and assigned to either a negative role (getting shocked) 
or a positive role (getting money or control)—either by 
drawing slips from a bowling bowl or some other way. In 
reality the subjects were always assigned to the positive role. 
When the subjects were asked to evaluate the character of 
their partners, they tended to give them a negative evalua-
tion (Lerner & Matthews, 1967).
In a third study, subjects were told that a fellow student had 
been awarded a cash prize as a result of a random draw. Af-
terwards, the subjects tended to conclude that this student 
had in fact worked harder than another student who lost 
the draw (Lerner & Miller, 1978:1030). 
Although the just world fallacy has been the subject of 
much discussion, subsequent studies have confirmed these 
findings (Lerner & Montada, 1998). What these experi-
ments suggest is that we o@en bend the realities so we can 
keep thinking that people get what they deserve. Besides 
the empirical evidence, this also seems like a reasonable 
thing to do from a psychological point of view—the 
thought that people can su'er unjustly is unsettling, as this 
means that we ourselves and people close to us could also 
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su'er unjustly. 
Just deserts in a just world
So, it seems clear that we tend to think the world is a just 
place, and that we o@en bend the facts to fit with this pic-
ture. How might this cognitive bias help explain away our 
beliefs in free will and moral responsibility? Well, if people 
were not free and morally responsible they would not really 
deserve their fortunes and mishaps and the world would 
not be a just place at all. Our beliefs in free will and moral 
responsibility help ensure that we can praise those who 
won in the lottery of life and blame those who lost. In this 
way we can go on thinking that bad things will not happen 
to us if we just make sure to stay on the straight and nar-
row path—and also that all of our e'orts will be rewarded 
in the end. On a commonsense view, beliefs in free will 
and moral responsibility also make us less (prospectively) 
responsible for the misfortunes of others, which is presum-
ably a somewhat attractive feature of these notions. If peo-
ple are truly responsible for their lot in life, then we are not 
really obligated to help them when needed—they brought 
their situation on themselves.
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In essence, our tendency to view the world as a just place 
fits squarely with a belief in free will and moral responsi-
bility. We generally like to see people get what they deserve, 
and so we o@en bend the realities to make sure that people 
deserve what they get. In this way the just world fallacy can 
help explain away our beliefs in free will and moral respon-
sibility. 
I will now turn to the last reason why we might believe in 
free will and moral responsibility, which is the experience 
we all have when we are faced with a choice.
The phenomenology of choice
Imagine that you are walking down the street, and you see 
a businesswoman in a fancy dress. As she pulls something 
up from her purse, she drops a twenty-dollar bill, unbe-
knownst to her, and apparently you are the only one who 
noticed. Right now it seems that you have a choice: you can 
either pick up the money for yourself, or you can let her 
know that she dropped something. 
In one way I agree that you have a choice here. I do not 
doubt that you can decide what to do. What I doubt is the 
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idea that you could deserve to su'er blame or punishment 
for your actions, as your decision at least in part will be 
determined by how honest a person you are—and I do not 
think you can be morally responsible for being or not be-
ing an honest person (cf. the preceding chapter). But when 
we are faced with situations like the above-mentioned, it 
certainly feels like the choice is entirely up to us—we 
experience total freedom and consequently, we feel morally 
responsible for our choice. I think experiences of this kind 
are in large part driving our beliefs in free will and moral 
responsibility. In this section I will expand on this experi-
ence, and I will argue that there are good reasons not to 
take our immediate experiences as veridical—a point I also 
made in the preceding chapter. 
The experience of responsibility
So, as you are standing there with the twenty-dollar bill on 
the ground and the woman on her way, you may believe 
that the Basic Argument is right. You may also believe 
that at some point you will look back on the situation and 
find that you did how you did because of things that were 
outside your control: your upbringing, past experiences etc. 
Nevertheless, you will probably feel totally free and morally 
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responsible for your choice anyway. If you end up taking 
the money you will feel like a bad person—most likely 
when the money is gone and there is nothing le@ but your 
guilty conscience. Presumably, you would blame yourself 
for your actions and feel like you deserve the blame of other 
people as well. On the other hand, if you give the money to 
the woman, you will feel like a good person. You will feel 
like you deserve to be praised for doing good—perhaps you 
will even reward yourself in some way, for being able to 
resist temptation. 
When we experience situations like the above, it just feels 
like we are totally free and morally responsible. However, 
the point of this chapter is to go beyond our immediate ex-
periences and look at some empirical evidence. And lots of 
evidence suggests that it is problematic to take our immedi-
ate experience at face value.
A couple of examples: In one study subjects were teamed 
up with a confederate who was posing as another partici-
pant. They were then given joint control over a computer 
mouse and asked to move a cursor on a screen that was 
visible to both. On the screen there were pictures of small 
toys (such as a dinosaur and a swan), and subjects were then 
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primed with various words through headphones. Remark-
ably, when subjects had been primed with a word, and the 
cursor landed on the corresponding picture, they tended to 
attribute the action to themselves—even when it was the 
confederate and not the subject who guided the landing 
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).
In another study subjects were primed with various words, 
such as ‘deer’, and required to type letters randomly on a 
keyboard—without seeing the computer screen. A@erwards 
they were shown a series of words which they had in fact 
not written, and they were then asked to rate those words 
in accordance with how secure they felt that they had 
authored them. The results showed that subjects were more 
likely to feel they had authored a word when they had been 
primed for that word than when the word had not been 
presented as a prime (Wegner, 2003:4).
Both of these studies suggest that we can feel like the au-
thor of an action even though we were not. So the feeling 
of being the author of an action should not just be assumed 
to be veridical. Of course, these studies do not prove that we 
are never the authors of our actions, but they do (or at least 
they should) chip away at our confidence in our insight 
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into our own experience. To conclude this section, I will 
elaborate on the limits of our ability to assess the causes 
and character of our own experiences.
The limits of introspection
According to a circulating story, Wittgenstein once asked a 
friend he met in a corridor: “Tell me, why do people always 
say that it was natural for men to assume that the sun went 
around the earth rather than the earth was rotating?” His 
friend said: “Well, obviously, because it just looks as if the 
sun is going around the earth.” To which Wittgenstein re-
plied: “Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked 
as if the earth were rotating?”
Now, it might be the case that the experiences of being free 
and morally responsible and not being free and responsible 
would be exactly the same, just like the experience of the 
sun orbiting the earth is exactly the same as the experience 
of the earth rotating around the sun. It can be di?cult for 
one to imagine how something would feel if things were 
di'erent than what one presumes to be the case. This goes 
to show that there are limits to what our immediate expe-
riences can tell us, but there are also limits to our ability 
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to assess our own experiences. In the words of Nisbett and 
Wilson: 
When people attempt to report on their cognitive 
processes, that is, on the processes mediating the e'ects 
of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the 
basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports 
are based on a priori, implicit casual theories, or judg-
ments about the extent to which a particular stimulus 
is a plausible cause of a given response (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977:231).
Lots of studies confirm the above. For example, in one 
study subjects were administered electric shocks to see how 
much shock they could stand. One half of the subjects were 
given a placebo pill, which they were told caused heart 
palpitations, tremors, and breathing irregularities (these are 
the typical problems people report when getting shocked). 
The hypothesis was that people would attribute much of 
the unpleasantness to the pill and consequently tolerate 
stronger shocks, which was confirmed by the study. People 
who received the pill tolerated four times as strong a shock 
as controls. When asked about the cause of this they just 
made up a reason. For instance, one subject said: “I played 
111
with radios as a child, so I’m used to electricity.” When the 
truth was revealed to the subjects, most even claimed that 
getting the pill had not a'ected them at all (Nisbett & 
Schachter, 1966).
In another study subjects watched a video of a teacher 
with a foreign accent. Divided into two groups, one group 
watched a video of the teacher being kind, and the oth-
er group watched a video of the teacher being strict and 
unfair. Subjects then rated how much they liked the teacher 
as well as his appearance and accent. Those who saw the 
first video thought that the teacher was attractive with a 
charming accent, and those who saw the second video 
thought that he was ugly with a harsh accent. Most subjects 
denied that their view of the teacher’s person had a'ected 
their view on his appearance and his accent. In fact, many 
claimed that the reason they did not like the teacher was 
his awful clothes and annoying accent—the exact same 
clothes that the first group said were part of the reason why 
they liked him so much (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
These studies, and many more, all suggest that our access to 
the cause and character of our own experiences are quite 
limited, and we o@en make up reasons a@er the fact. This is 
112
a good reason not to assume that our immediate experienc-
es can just be taken at face value.
A doubtful experience
As I noted in the beginning of this chapter, one might ob-
ject to my thesis that it is contrary to our common experi-
ence, and that the best theory is the one that fits best with 
our experience. But as I have showed, there are good rea-
sons to be skeptical of the veracity of this experience, which 
can be somewhat explained away by psychology. To be clear, 
the evidence presented in the preceding sections do not 
show that we are not free and morally responsible, but it 
raises doubt about the veracity of the common experience 
we have of being free and morally responsible. In this way 
it counters the objection that my argument is contrary to 
our common experience. 
I also noted that drawing on literature from psychology 
could perhaps help push the debate on free will and moral 
responsibility forward—maybe even more than what any 
direct argument can do. This is a point I would like to 
expand on to conclude this chapter.
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How can studies from psychology help push the debate for-
ward? Well, the notions of free will and moral responsibility 
has been the subject of philosophical discussion for millen-
nia, and it seems highly unlikely that any genuinely new 
philosophical positions or arguments will suddenly appear 
on stage. Of course, existing positions and arguments can—
and most likely will—be further refined in the future, but it 
seems fair to say that the debate has reached somewhat of a 
stalemate. 
Meanwhile, cognitive science has made many break-
throughs during the last fi@y years or so, and with the 
advances in neuroscience and related fields we can expect 
even more breakthroughs in the following years. These 
insights have not been available to previous thinkers, and 
many insights from these fields seem to bear relevance to 
the philosophical discussion on free will and moral respon-
sibility. And so it seems likely that insights from these fields 
can help push the debate forward. 
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Don’t tell anyone!
In the preceding chapters I have argued that no one is ever 
morally responsible for anything, and even though we 
might have an experience of being free and morally respon-
sible there are good reasons not to take this experience as 
veridical. Now, be that as it may, it might be objected that 
people would become immoral if they stopped believing 
in free will and moral responsibility. Of course, whether 
people would become immoral without belief in free will 
and moral responsibility has nothing to do with whether 
people really are morally responsible for anything. This 
could be the case even though the heavens would fall. But 
since I am advocating the view that people are not morally 
responsible for anything, it seems appropriate to meet this 
objection anyway, which I will do in this chapter. 
In essence, I will discuss a moral objection to my conclu-
sion. In fact, empirical studies actually suggest that people 
are more inclined to cheat on a test, or give hot salsa to 
people who dislike spicy food, if they have been exposed 
to arguments against free will—and consequently moral 
responsibility (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 
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2009). However, I will argue that this objection against my 
conclusion does not succeed.
In the following sections I will present the above-men-
tioned studies, and I will suggest that the results of these 
studies might stem from either ego depletion or reactance, 
two psychological reactions that are well known in psychol-
ogy. If the results of the studies stem from these reactions, it 
seems unlikely that disbelief in free will and moral respon-
sibility will have bad consequences on a large scale.  
A@erwards, I will go on to argue that even if disbelief in 
free will and moral responsibility has bad consequences, as 
the studies suggest, these consequences may be outweighed 
by the positive consequences associated with disbelief in 
free will and moral responsibility. For example, people 
might become more compassionate and sympathetic 
towards o'enders, when they recognize that o'enders are 
victims of their circumstances. In this way, disbelief in free 
will and moral responsibility might lead to more under-
standing and less stigma. 
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The value of believing: two empirical     
studies
As noted, objections might be raised against my conclusion 
given that there is great value in believing in free will and 
moral responsibility, as disbelief in these notions would 
lead to immoral behavior. And in fact, this objection seems 
to be supported by two recent empirical studies. In the fol-
lowing I will take a closer look at these studies, as I do not 
think this conclusion is warranted from the data. Since it is 
important to know the details of the particular experiments 
in order to see why the results of the studies could be due 
to the aforementioned psychological reactions, I will de-
scribe these experiments with some detail in the following.
I forgot to push the button
The first of these studies consists of two di'erent exper-
iments. In the first experiment subjects were randomly 
assigned to read one of two passages from The Astonishing 
Hypothesis, a book written by Francis Crick (1994). One 
group read a passage “claiming that rational, high-minded 
people—including, according to Crick, most scientists—
now recognize that actual free will is an illusion,” and the 
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other group “read a passage from a chapter on conscious-
ness, which did not discuss free will.” Subjects were then 
given a task, in which they had to calculate the answers to 
20 mental-arithmetic problems on a computer (e.g. “1 + 8 
+ 18 – 12 + 19 – 7 + 17 – 2 + 8 – 4 = ?”). They were told that 
the correct answer would appear on the screen while they 
were trying to solve each problem, due to a bug in the com-
puter program, and that they could “stop the answer from 
being displayed by pressing the space bar a@er the problem 
appeared.” They were also told that the experimenter would 
not know whether they had cheated, but that “they should 
try to solve the problems honestly, on their own.” Of course, 
“the computer had been rigged not only to show the 
answers, but also to record the number of space-bar press-
es.” Sure enough, “as predicted, participants cheated more 
frequently a@er reading the anti-free-will essay…than a@er 
reading the control essay” (Vohs & Schooler, 2008:50). 
Although the results of the experiment suggest that disbe-
lief in free will encourages immoral behavior, it is worth 
noticing that doing nothing was coded as cheating in the 
above experiment. Therefore, a second experiment was 
carried out to make sure that the anti-free-will essay had 
not just “induced passivity generally, rather than immoral 
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behavior specifically” (Vohs & Schooler, 2008:51).  
In the second experiment subjects “were randomly as-
signed to one of five conditions, in three of which cheating 
was possible.” In the three conditions where cheating was 
possible, subjects either read statements endorsing free will 
(e.g. “I am able to override the genetic and environmental 
factors that sometimes influence my behavior”), statements 
endorsing determinism (e.g. “a belief in free will contra-
dicts the known fact that the universe is governed by lawful 
principles of science”), or neutral statements (e.g. “sugar 
cane and sugar beets are grown in 112 countries”). A@er-
wards, subjects were given a set of 15 problems involving 
reading-comprehension, math, and logic. They “were told 
that the experimenter was investigating people’s enjoyment 
of tasks when they receive feedback and rewards for per-
formance, and hence that they would receive $1 for each 
problem they solved correctly.” The experimenter then told 
the subjects (in the cheating-possible conditions) that she 
had to leave, due to unforeseen circumstances, and that they 
“should work for a maximum of 15 min, and then score 
their own problems and pay themselves $1 for each correct 
answer.” As predicted, the results “revealed that participants 
who had read the determinism statements and who were 
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allowed to pay themselves for correct answers walked 
away with more money than the others” (Vohs & Schooler, 
2008:51f).
Now, there are lots of interesting points to discuss in 
relation to the above study. For example, did the subjects 
(or the researchers) confuse the thesis of determinism with 
fatalism? (This is a common mistake.) To what extent can 
these results be transferred to real life situations? It seems 
like one thing to cheat on a test and quite another to rob 
people, deliberately hurt someone’s feelings, violently 
attack someone, and so on. I will not go into these discus-
sions here though. Instead I will suggest that the results of 
the above study might stem from either ego depletion or 
reactance, but before we get into that I want to take a closer 
look at a second study.
Would you like some hot salsa on that?
The other study I will mention here consisted of three 
experiments. In the first experiment subjects were “ran-
domly assigned to read sentences in support of either free 
will or determinism or, in the neutral control condition, 
sentences that had no relevance to free will or determinism.” 
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(The same sentences that were used in the aforementioned 
study.) They were then given “six hypothetical scenarios in 
which they had the opportunity to help others (e.g., giving 
money to a homeless person, allowing a fellow classmate 
to use one’s cellular phone).” A@erwards they were asked to 
“indicate the likelihood that they would help in that situa-
tion (based on how they would behave in each situation at 
the present moment) using a scale from 1 (not at all likely) 
to 9 (very likely).” As predicted, the results “indicated that 
participants in the determinism condition…were less will-
ing to help than were participants in the free will condition” 
(Baumeister et al., 2009:262).
The second experiment was designed to measure “behavior-
al commitment to provide actual help rather than relying 
on self-reported willingness to help in hypothetical scenari-
os.” In this experiment subjects were given a test “developed 
to assess individual di'erences in belief in free will and 
determinism.” They were then told that they were going to 
listen to a radio program, which would be chosen at ran-
dom. However, “all participants listened to the same radio 
interview.” In this interview, “a woman named Katie Banks 
described how her parents had been killed in a car accident 
and how she was now solely responsible for the care of her 
121
siblings.” A@erwards, the subjects were informed that the 
experiment was over, and they received a bogus debriefing. 
However, before they le@ they were told, “that the faculty 
supervisor for the study (Dr. Edmunds) had requested that 
all participants who heard the Katie Banks interview be 
given the opportunity to volunteer to help her.” They were 
then handed “a volunteer form on which [they] indicated 
how many hours (0 to 9 or more) they were willing to help.” 
As predicted, the results “showed that disbelief in free will 
predicted a lower number of hours for which participants 
volunteered” (Baumeister et al., 2009:264f).
The third experiment was designed to test the “hypothe-
sis that disbelief in free will would influence aggression 
toward a seemingly innocent target.” In this experiment 
subjects were asked to complete a taste preference form, 
and they were paired up with an unknown partner. They 
were also randomly assigned to read the same sentences 
as in the first experiment, except this time there were no 
neutral condition. A@er reading the sentences, they “were 
asked to prepare some food samples for their partner.” They 
were then “given a taste preferences form, which they were 
told had been filled out by their partner. In reality, all par-
ticipants received an identical taste preferences form, which 
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had been filled out to highlight the partner’s strong dislike 
for spicy food.” A@erwards they were “given three tortilla 
chips and a jar of salsa. The salsa was ostensibly spicy, and 
the jar had the words “hot” printed on it in several places.” 
The experimenter made it clear to the subjects that they 
could “add as much salsa as they wanted”, and it was also 
stressed “that the partner would be required to eat all of the 
food on the plate.” Sure enough, the results “revealed that 
participants who had read the deterministic sentences gave 
their partners more of the unwelcome hot sauce…com-
pared to participants who read the sentences supporting 
free will” (Baumeister et al., 2009:266).
Judging from the above study it seems that people are not 
only less willing to help when they have been exposed to 
anti-free-will thinking, they also tend to be more aggressive 
towards others. Held together with the first study, it appears 
that anti-free-will thinking turns people into apathetic 
stealing aggressive cheaters! However, in the following 
section I will argue that the data from these studies do not 
warrant this conclusion, as the results of the studies might 
have been due to either ego depletion or reactance—two 
common psychological reactions.
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Ego depletion and reactance
Now, it might be the case the results in the above studies 
were really due to anti-free-will thinking in particular, but 
there are at least two other possible explanations of the re-
sults. The first I will be considering is ego depletion, which 
“refers to the loss of a personal resource (and associated 
breakdown in performance) due to the previous exertion 
of self-control or other e'ortful and willful acts of the 
self.” Lots of research suggests that there are limits to how 
much self-control one can exert and also that this resource 
(called ego strength) is depleted by exertion of self-control. 
For example, “in one experiment, individuals who were 
asked not to eat freshly made chocolate chip cookies…sub-
sequently quit working on a di?cult puzzle sooner than 
individuals who were asked not to eat radishes” (Muraven, 
2007). Consider for example a shopping mall. It seems like 
malls were designed with ego depletion in mind. When you 
are walking through a mall you are constantly confronted 
with temptation, and most people give in at some point. 
Ego depletion seems like a good explanation for this kind 
of behavior. 
Perhaps it is not that surprising that resisting hard temp-
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tation has an impact on your ability to resist further temp-
tation. More surprisingly, ego strength also seems to be de-
pleted by performing di?cult tasks that has nothing to do 
with self-regulation at all. For example, “using logic to draw 
conclusions and implications from ideas, extrapolating 
from known facts to make estimates about unknowns, and 
generating novel ideas” also seems to deplete ego strength 
(Schmeichel et al., 2003). 
Now, how may ego depletion have contributed to immoral 
behavior in the aforementioned studies on anti-free-will 
thinking and immorality? Well, the anti-free-will thinking 
may simply have challenged the subject’s existing beliefs 
to a degree where it had an impact on their ego strength. 
The notion of free will is very dear to most people—per-
sonal experience tells me that suggesting that free will is 
an illusion usually results in quite some discussion. For 
many people, free will is what makes humans unique; it is 
the hallmark of humanity. Therefore it seems plausible that 
anti-free-will thinking is provocative to most people, both 
because the notion of free will is dear to them and because 
anti-free-will thinking is contrary to common experience.
Whether the anti-free-will thinking simply depleted the 
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subjects ego strength is of course an empirical question. 
One could probably find this out if one ran an experiment 
that was purposely designed to see whether challenging 
ideas depletes ego strength. For example, one could pres-
ent males with the idea that men are inferior to women 
in many regards, or one could present nationalists with 
derogatory statements about their country and see whether 
this would also have a negative impact on their behavior. If 
so, then it would seem like there is not much to fear from 
anti-free-will thinking in particular when it comes to im-
moral behavior.  
Another possible explanation of the results in the above 
study is a psychological reaction called reactance, which is 
a motivational reaction in response to a perceived threat 
against behavioral freedom (Krahé, 1995). O@en, when we 
perceive a loss of freedom, we experience psychological 
reactance “which urges attempts to regain the threatened or 
lost freedom” (Krahé, 1995:466). For example, a child who 
is told by her parents that she cannot drink alcohol may 
suddenly find alcohol consumption more attractive than 
before; an employee who is told by a supervisor to stop 
talking on the job may start talking even more, and so on. 
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A classic example of this type of reaction can be found 
in Notes from Underground by Dostoyevsky, where a 
man (whose name we never learn) struggles with the idea 
that his decisions are being controlled by society and the 
mechanical forces of his body. As a consequence hereof, he 
begins to do the opposite of what is expected of him. For 
example, he claims to enjoy the pain of a toothache, and he 
openly insults some old schoolmates that he really wants 
to befriend. Whenever he senses that other people might 
expect something of him, he does the complete opposite 
out of spite. In this way he tries to gain control over his life 
and claim his freedom from society and the mechanical 
forces of his body.
How may reactance have played a role in the aforemen-
tioned studies? Well, just like the man in Dostoyevsky’s nov-
el, the subjects in the experiments may simply have reacted 
out of spite. It may be the case that they wanted to prove 
to themselves (and the researchers) that they in fact were 
able to decide for themselves by acting out of character. To 
most people the idea that we do not have free will would 
probably appear as a threat to behavioral freedom, and so it 
seems likely that people would try to claim their freedom 
by doing something they would not have done otherwise. 
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OAand, it would be more di?cult to test whether or not 
reactance might have played a role in the studies than 
whether or not ego depletion did. However, it seems plau-
sible. And if some of the results from the studies can be 
explained by psychological reactance, then it seems that we 
do not have that much to fear from anti-free-will thinking 
in particular. It would be quite di?cult for most people 
to keep acting out of character to prove a point, just like 
it is for the unnamed man in Dostoyevsky’s novel. And so 
the objection that people would become immoral if they 
stopped believing in free will and moral responsibility 
seems less convincing. 
In conclusion, the results of the aforementioned studies 
do not warrant the conclusion that anti-free-will think-
ing leads to immoral behavior. More research is definitely 
needed to draw this conclusion. But even if the results did 
warrant such conclusion, anti-free-will thinking might also 
have many positive consequences. In the following I want 
to look closer at some of these potentially good conse-
quences of disbelief in free will and moral responsibility.
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The value of disbelieving
As noted, it is not clear that anti-free-will thinking will 
lead to immoral behavior. Be that as it may, let us assume 
for the sake of discussion that people actually will become 
somewhat immoral without belief in free will and moral 
responsibility. In the following sections I argue that these 
consequences might still be outweighed by a number of 
good consequences associated with disbelief in free will 
and moral responsibility. Here I will focus on four potential 
and positive consequences: (i) equanimity, (ii) compassion, 
(iii) equality, and (iv) moral anger.
Equanimity 
One positive consequence of disbelief in free will and mor-
al responsibility might be an ability to face hardships and 
bad things in life with equanimity, a point o@en stressed by 
philosophers in the Stoic tradition (Pereboom, 2001:207). 
For example, Spinoza argued that a “clear and distinct per-
ception of [our] own place in nature” will “lead to an ability 
to bear things with equanimity” (Nadler, 2006:255). 
This ability could be a profound source of comfort. Con-
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sider for example the parents of a child with a terrible 
disease. Most people would arguably find a way to blame 
themselves in such a situation, as noted in the preceding 
chapter—perhaps one would think that one should have 
lived healthier during pregnancy etc. Such parents could 
arguably find much comfort in the thought that they are 
not truly responsible for the disease of their child—like 
most probably would if the disease had a genetic cause. 
This could (presumably) enable the parents to deal with 
the situation with mental calmness and composure, which 
would (arguably) both increase the child’s chance of recov-
ery as well as the immediate wellbeing of the whole family. 
Now, some might think it inappropriate to face such a situ-
ation with equanimity, but facing challenges with calmness 
and composure is not the same as facing them with indif-
ference. There is no reason why the parents should care less 
about their child, just because they do not consider them-
selves responsible for the child’s disease. Just as there is no 
reason to think that they would be less concerned with 
avoiding diseases in the future.
Libertarianism, on the other hand, cannot provide this 
route to equanimity (Pereboom, 2001:207), because if we 
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have libertarian freedom, we could always have acted di'er-
ently than what we actually did—even if the relevant con-
ditions had been exactly the same. Although this idea can 
be quite attractive, as it leaves us with a great deal of control 
over our lives, it can also leave us with a lot of (apparently) 
useless self-blame, guilt, regret, and so on.
Just like disbelief in free will and moral responsibility can 
lead to less self-blame it can also lead to less blame of others. 
This is another possible good consequence of disbelief in 
free will and moral responsibility: it may encourage sympa-
thy and compassion. This is the subject of the next section.
Compassion 
It seems quite plausible that people would become more 
compassionate and sympathetic towards others if they did 
not believe in free will and moral responsibility. For in-
stance, we get a lot less angry with people who are not con-
sidered responsible for their behavior, e.g. a kleptomaniac, 
than we do with people whom we consider to be morally 
responsible. 
In fact, a recent study found that judges are more lenient 
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on criminals when they are faced with evidence of a bio-
mechanical cause of the criminal’s behavior (Aspinwall et 
al., 2012). Of course, not everyone will consider this a good 
thing. For instance, some are worried that neuroscience and 
related fields will provide defense attorneys with an abun-
dance of biomechanical excuses, and consequently that 
o'enders will not get the punishment they deserve. How-
ever, it seems like most defenders of desert-based theories 
of punishment would agree that criminals in general are 
punished harder than what they can (reasonably) be said to 
deserve, so a more compassionate justice system could also 
be a good thing from this point of view.
Disbelief in free will and moral responsibility might also 
lead to more forgiveness and tolerance, which are typical 
manifestations of compassion. It is a lot easier to forgive 
others if one sees their actions as a result of things outside 
their control than if one considers their actions to be freely 
chosen. Likewise, it is also easier to tolerate other people’s 
flaws and idiosyncrasies if one recognizes that people are 
not really responsible for their own character. On these two 
points it seems quite likely that disbelief in free will and 
moral responsibility will lead to more compassion. 
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It also seems likely that any increases in compassion from 
disbelief in free will and moral responsibility would benefit 
the people who need it the most: the poor and the crimi-
nals. This leads to the next section on equality.
Equality 
Another possible good consequence of disbelief in free will 
and moral responsibility is a society with a more equal dis-
tribution of benefits and burdens. It is my contention that 
much inequality is driven by belief in free will and moral 
responsibility, because these notions fit squarely with the 
idea that every person is the architect of his or her own for-
tune. As noted in the preceding chapter, belief in free will 
and moral responsibility leads people to think that they are 
not (prospectively) responsible for other people’s poverty 
and hardships. This is because beliefs in free will and moral 
responsibility lead people to think that all people deserve 
their lot in life.
The same goes for unequal distribution of punishment. Be-
cause people tend to believe in free will and moral respon-
sibility, they also tend to believe that people are responsible 
for breaking the law, and consequently that they therefore 
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deserve to be punished for o'ending. This leads people to 
ignore that crime is intimately connected with structural 
relations like poverty and lack of social recognition, as well 
as more personal factors like poor impulse control, bad up-
bringing, and so on. And so, punishment o@en falls heavy 
on the shoulders of people at the bottom of society.
In this way belief in free will and moral responsibility 
is closely connected to political ideals that appear to be 
contrary to an equal distribution of benefits and burdens. 
In fact, a recent study suggests “belief in free will is associ-
ated with a conservative worldview including such facets 
as authoritarianism, religiosity, punitiveness, and moralistic 
standards for judging self and others” (Carey & Paulhus, 
2012). 
In other words, a strong belief in free will and moral 
responsibility seems to be a driving factor behind certain 
politics: a hard approach on crime and a so@ approach on 
redistribution of wealth. Of course, not all will consider it 
a good thing if disbelief in free will and moral responsibil-
ity leads away from these politics. However, I reckon most 
people will agree that more equality is a good thing, ceteris 
paribus—and will only object to a more equal distribution 
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of benefits and burdens if this comes at the expense of per-
sonal liberty or some other value.
Moral anger
The last potential good consequence I will consider here 
has to do with moral anger. This is the “type of anger…that 
is directed toward someone who is represented as having 
done wrong (sometimes the representation is accurate, 
sometimes not).” Not all anger is moral anger. Sometimes 
we get angry with someone simply because they lack 
certain abilities, or because they perform poorly on some 
particular task—even though we do not really consider 
them at fault. We also get angry at machinery due to a 
malfunctioning (like Basil did with his car), and sometimes 
our anger does not even have a target. Most human anger is 
moral anger though (Pereboom, 2001:208).
Moral anger plays an important role in our lives. For exam-
ple, it “motivates us to resist oppression, injustice, and abuse.” 
Of course, this is a good thing. But expressions of moral an-
ger can also have many detrimental e'ects, for instance, on 
“the well-being of those to whom they are directed.” Such 
expressions are frequently “intended to cause physical or 
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emotional pain,” and for this reason “moral anger o@en has 
a tendency to damage or destroy relationships.” Since ex-
pressions of moral anger are usually harmful, they demand 
some form of moral justification, and “this demand is made 
more acute by the fact that we are o@en attached to moral 
anger; we o@en in a sense enjoy displaying it, and this is 
partly why we want these displays to be morally justifiable.” 
The most common justifications run through the notion of 
moral responsibility (Pereboom, 2001:208f). 
It is not unreasonable to think that we might be using a 
false belief to rationalize the expression of anger. In fact, 
other schemes of false beliefs seem to have been used for 
this purpose. For example, Girard has argued that many 
of the beliefs associated with the practice of human sacri-
fice served to rationalize expressions of anger (1977). On 
Girard’s view, the practice of human sacrifice was a result of 
tension from living in human communities (mostly driven 
by envy). The institution of sacrifice provided the commu-
nity with an outlet where people could vent their anger, in 
a way that did not threaten the integrity of the community. 
Such systems of sacrifice were always associated with beliefs 
that somehow justified the institution of sacrifice, e.g. a 
god who required or enjoyed the sacrifice etc. In this way, 
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violent but controlled expressions of moral anger were 
justified by a system of false religious beliefs (Pereboom, 
2001:209).
Girard also argued that modern legal systems have taken 
the place of human sacrifice in society, as a new outlet for 
the expressions of anger. Just like the institution of hu-
man sacrifice, legal systems are also associated with beliefs 
that justify the violence they carry out, namely the beliefs 
that people are free and morally responsible (Pereboom, 
2001:210). 
Since moral anger is so closely connected to the idea of free 
will and moral responsibility, it seems likely that we would 
experience less moral anger if people stopped believing in 
the notions of free will and moral responsibility. Of course, 
this could be a problem when it comes to the good con-
sequences of moral anger, but it seems to me that there is 
no reason to think that we could not engage in di'erent 
motivational strategies to keep up the good e'ects of moral 
anger while avoiding the detrimental e'ects.
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Tell everybody!
In conclusion, it does not seem likely that people would be-
come immoral if they did not believe in free will and moral 
responsibility. More empirical work is definitely needed 
before the data could warrant this conclusion. But even if 
people did become somewhat immoral, there would also 
be many potentially good consequences from disbelief in 
free will and moral responsibility, namely more equanimity 
in the face of bad things, more compassion for others, a 
more equal society, and less moral anger. 
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Implications
Coming to the end of this thesis, it seems appropriate to 
account for the implications of the arguments I have been 
making throughout the thesis. As noted in the introduction, 
the notion of moral responsibility plays an important part 
in many philosophical theories as well as in our daily lives 
and in the institutions of our society. Consequently, the 
view that no one is morally responsible for anything has 
many implications. 
Some of these implications I already touched upon in the 
previous chapter, in my discussion of the potential good 
consequences of disbelief in free will and moral respon-
sibility. In this chapter I want to present the most notable 
philosophical implications of the view that no one is ever 
morally responsible for anything. These implications 
mainly have to do with the philosophy of punishment and 
distributive justice, so these are the areas I will focus on in 
the following sections.
To be more specific, I will argue that the upshot of my 
thesis is bad news for the theory of retributivism, which is 
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one of the main strands of theories in the philosophy of 
punishment, since all forms of retributivism rely on the no-
tion of moral responsibility. Likewise, my thesis also poses a 
challenge to theories in the field of distributive justice that 
rely on the notion of moral responsibility—namely, theo-
ries that are grounded on desert-based principles.
Punishment
As noted, the notion of moral responsibility plays an im-
portant role for some theories in the philosophy of pun-
ishment, and consequently, my thesis has profound impli-
cations for these theories. These implications also reach far 
into the institutions of our society, since these theories—at 
least to some extent—have shaped parts of the justice 
systems in the Western world. To see this, it is necessary to 
know something about the philosophy of punishment and 
the current arrangement of the justice system, so I will start 
by noting a few important points. 
For most people, it is obvious that harm is something to be 
avoided, unless one has ample reason. Since punishment 
involves deliberate infliction of harm, it seems clear that 
punishment needs some kind of justification. This seems 
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especially true when it comes to legal punishment, as this 
form of punishment involves routinely infliction of harm. 
Furthermore, legal punishment also imposes considerable 
economic and social burdens on society.
Now, what might justify the harm imposed by the legal sys-
tem? Philosophers have wrestled with this question for ages, 
and two main views have emerged from the philosophical 
literature. On one view, punishment is justified by its poten-
tial good consequences (consequentialism), i.e. punishment 
is justified to the extent that it can prevent more harm 
than it causes. On another view punishment is justified by 
the desert of the o'ender (retributivism), i.e. punishment 
is justified to the extent that it is a deserved response to a 
wrongdoing.
To be clear, consequentialism comes in many forms. For 
example, consequentialism may be directed at both the 
promotion of welfare, fairness, protection of individual 
rights, and so on (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012). And a conse-
quentialist can use punishment to realize the above aims in 
di'erent ways, e.g. through deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation. Likewise, retributivism also comes in many 
forms. For example, some retributivists hold that o'enders 
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deserve to be punished because they have taken an unfair 
advantage over law-abiding citizens, some hold that pun-
ishment is deserved when it properly expresses appropriate 
emotions, and so on (Du', 2008). 
Responsibility and retributivism
Since the 1970’s, retributivism has been the dominant 
view in the philosophy of punishment (Du', 2008; Ryberg, 
2011), and since then retributivism has arguably shaped 
many jurisdictions in the Western world—at least to some 
extent. Consequently, many jurisdictions are now meting 
out punishments according to a doctrine of just deserts, al-
though considerations of crime prevention also play a role.
However, as noted, the upshot of my thesis is bad news for 
the theory of retributivism. Throughout this thesis I have 
argued that no one is ever morally responsible for anything 
in the sense that no one can ever deserve to su'er blame 
or punishment. Consequently, if my thesis holds, then it 
would seem like all forms of retributivist theories break 
down. To expand a little on this point I want to note a few 
things about the relationship between desert and responsi-
bility. 
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Just like responsibility, desert is a concept that pervades 
ordinary morality. For example, we might say that “e'ort 
deserves success, wrongdoing deserves punishment, inno-
cent su'ering deserves sympathy or compensation, virtue 
deserves happiness, and so on” (McLeod, 2008). And just 
like responsibility, desert is a somewhat vague term that is 
not very well understood, although we all have an intuitive 
understanding of what the term means. 
However, from the literature on desert it seems clear that 
desert is usually taken to be a three-part relation between a 
subject, an object, and a basis (ibid.). For example, we might 
say that a victim of a crime deserves to be compensated—in 
this case the victim would be the subject, the compensation 
would be the object, and the fact that this person was the 
victim of a crime would be the basis. From this example, it 
is clear that one can (arguably) deserve something without 
being morally responsible at all, so why does the view that 
no one is ever morally responsible for anything rule out 
retributivism?
The reason for this is that the kind of desert that is at play 
in retributivist theories is action-based desert, and it seems 
clear that one cannot deserve anything on basis of one’s ac-
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tions unless one was morally responsible for those actions. 
If this was not so, one could deserve to be punished for 
an accident, e.g. for tripping and breaking a vase, and this 
would arguably be absurd. 
Of course, one might still hold that there are side-con-
straints on the forms of punishment that can legitimately 
be inflicted—no matter what consequences this might 
have—as such constraints could (arguably) be based on 
some kind of respect for persons. But this would appar-
ently not be a form of retributivism, but some other kind 
of non-consequentialist theory of punishment. A@er all, 
action-based desert is the hallmark of retributivism, and 
a theory that did not appeal to action-based desert would 
seemingly be unrecognizable as a retributivist theory. 
Based on the above, the theory of retributivism cannot be 
easily reconciled with the view that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything. As a result, if one accepts the argu-
ments I have been making throughout this thesis, it seems 
that there is good reason to revise the parts of our current 
justice systems that are based on retributivism.
I will now turn to the field of distributive justice, which is 
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another area where my thesis has profound implications, 
since some theories in this field also rely on the notion of 
moral responsibility. And just like with the area of punish-
ment, context is needed to see the implications of my thesis, 
so I will begin by noting a few important points.
Distributive justice
Distributive justice has to do with the fair allocation of var-
ious benefits and burdens in a society—as well as between 
generations. Theories in this field are perhaps best thought 
of as theories “providing moral guidance for the political 
processes and structures that a'ect the distribution” of ben-
efits and burdens (Lamont & Favor, 2013). Precisely what 
counts as a benefit (and a burden) is of course a subject of 
discussion, but examples typically include material goods, 
services, social recognition, welfare, and so on. 
Traditionally, the notion of desert has played an important 
role in the field of distributive justice, in the sense that 
many theorists throughout history have held that facts on 
distributive justice are (at least in part) determined by facts 
on desert (McLeod, 2008). Of course, not all forms of desert 
depend on the notion of moral responsibility, as we saw in 
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relation to the theory of retributivism. However, as we will 
soon see, most desert-based theories in the field of distrib-
utive justice rely on the notion of moral responsibility, as 
they mainly deal with action-based desert. 
Nevertheless, desert-based theories still di'er according to 
what they more precisely identify as the basis of deserving. 
For example, Aristotle held that virtue is the best desert-ba-
sis for the distribution of benefits and burdens. Contem-
porary thinkers, however, usually deal with “desert-bases 
that are more practically implemented in complex modern 
societies.” These desert-bases can roughly be divided in 
three categories: (i) contribution, (ii) e'ort, and (iii) com-
pensation (Lamont & Favor, 2013). 
According to theorists who take contribution to be the best 
desert-basis, “people should be rewarded for their work 
activity according to the value of their contribution to the 
social product.” For the theorists who focus on e'ort, “peo-
ple should be rewarded according to the e'ort they expend 
in their work activity.” And for the last group of theorists, 
“people should be rewarded according to the costs they 
incur in their work activity.” Notably, on the basis of all of 
these theories, one can only deserve benefits or burdens to 
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the extent that one’s work has to do with procuring some 
kind of social good (Lamont & Favor, 2013). For example, 
one would not deserve compensation if one spent two years 
away from one’s family, alone in the fields, struggling to 
find a four-leaf clover with perfect proportions.
Responsibility, desert, and distribution
As noted, the upshot of my thesis is bad news for all des-
ert-based theories, at least to the extent that they rely on 
action-based desert. This is arguably the case with all des-
ert-based theories that belong to one of the aforementioned 
categories; as contributions, e'ort, and costs incurred in 
one’s work activity all have to do with one’s actions. 
To further expand on this point, consider someone who 
happens to contribute a great deal to some social good by 
not doing anything at all—say, this person’s body somehow 
developed antibodies that lead to a cure against some kind 
of cancer. It seems odd to say that this person would de-
serve some benefit on this basis, if that person did nothing 
at all to help with the cure besides developing antibodies. 
The reason for this seems to be that one can only deserve 
something on basis of a contribution if one contributed by 
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some kind of action. 
Likewise, to deserve something on the basis of e'ort seems 
to (inherently) demand some kind of action, and the same 
seems to apply to costs incurred by work activity. If one did 
nothing at all, then one certainly did not exert any e'ort or 
incur any costs that could make one deserve compensation. 
And so it seems like all desert-based theories that have to do 
with contribution, e'ort, or costs incurred by work activity 
rely on action-based desert. Consequently they also rely on 
the notion of moral responsibility, and therefore they all 
face serious problems if my thesis is correct.
Of course, one can still find a place for desert in the area of 
distributive justice that does not rely on the notion of mor-
al responsibility. For example, one might hold that everyone 
deserves a certain minimum of wealth, or opportunities, 
simply by virtue of being a person. Such a position would 
be compatible with the view that no one is ever morally 
responsible for anything, although such a position would 
arguably be much di'erent from current desert-based theo-
ries in the field of distributive justice. 
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have defended the view that no one is ever 
morally responsible for anything in the sense that could 
make one deserve blame or punishment (or to be less hap-
py). I have done this by arguing that who we are depends 
on the structure of our brain—as well as the features of 
the situations we are in, our upbringing, and other things 
we do not control. I have also argued, following Strawson 
(1998, 2011), that what we do depends on who we are, so 
for us to be morally responsible for what we do, we would 
have to be morally responsible for who we are. But we can-
not be morally responsible for who we are, as this depends 
on things outside our control. Consequently, no one is ever 
morally responsible for anything. 
Since this conclusion seems to fly in the face of our com-
mon experience of being the masters of our own fate, and 
some might say that the best theory is the one that fits best 
with experience, I have also argued that we do not have 
good insight into the causes and character of our experi-
ences. In this way I have countered an objection against the 
above argument.
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Lastly, I have argued that we should not keep up the illu-
sion of moral responsibility, although studies suggest that 
it could have bad consequences to tell people that they are 
not morally responsible for anything. For one thing, this 
conclusion does not seem to be warranted from the results 
of these studies, but it might also have many potentially 
good consequences if people stopped believing in the 
notions of free will and moral responsibility. These conse-
quences would namely be more compassion, equanimity, 
and equality, as well as less moral anger.
As noted, the view that no one is ever morally responsible 
for anything has many implications, especially when it 
comes to the areas of punishment and distributive justice. 
Most notably, this view has profound implications for the 
theory of retributivism—as all retributivist theories rely on 
the notion of moral responsibility—as well as desert-based 
theories in the field of distributive justice.
This view also has many implications in our daily lives. Just 
like King Xerxes was furious with the sea and sentenced it 
to be whipped and condemned, we all tend to get furious 
with each other and ourselves at times. It seems to me that 
this is o@en because we consider each other and ourselves 
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to be morally responsible for our actions. Though it might 
be expedient to become furious at times, this is not always 
the case, and so we could definitely do without a lot of the 
moral anger that is associated with the notion of moral 
responsibility.
It can be a good thing to be reminded of the false beliefs 
that people have held in the past and the bad practices that 
were a natural part of their life. This can help us to be more 
critical of our own beliefs and practices. Perhaps future gen-
erations will look back and lament our notions of free will 
and moral responsibility and find our current institutions 
of justice as abominable as we now find the institution of 
human sacrifice. And perhaps people will look back at to-
day, and smile at the thought of how we were all in a sense 
whipping the sea.
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